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IMPLICIT BIAS, ELECTION ‘08, AND THE MYTH OF
A POST-RACIAL AMERICA
GREGORY S. PARKS* & JEFFREY J. RACHLINSKI**
ABSTRACT
The election of Barack Obama as the forty-fourth President of the United States signals
that the traditional modes of thinking about race in America are outdated. Commentators
and pundits have begun to suggest that the election of a black man to the nation's highest
office means that the United States has entered a post-racial era in which civil rights laws
are becoming unnecessary. Although President Obama’s election means that explicit, open
anti-black racism has largely faded, an analysis of the campaign’s rhetoric and themes
suggests that unconscious racism is alive and well. Rather than suggest a retreat from
traditional civil rights protections, the 2008 election calls for enhancing and maintaining
efforts to ensure that civil rights laws address less virulent, but persistent, forms of racism
that persist in America today.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Barack Obama’s rapid rise in American politics and his ascension
to the nation’s highest office is historic. Without question, his election
signals a seismic shift in the way Americans think and talk about
race. It is a significant leap in America’s long journey towards racial
equality. Americans on both the political left and right have begun to
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assert that we now live in a post-racial country.1 If the country has
entered a new era of race relations, what should become of the laws
that were created for the era that has supposedly past?
For many, the answer to this question is that the laws prohibiting
discrimination in the workforce and in the electoral processes are no
longer useful. In the words of Professor Richard Epstein,
discrimination should now be left to “die on the vine,”2 now that it
has been deprived of the widespread acquiescence and social support
that once nourished it. Under this view, the civil rights laws have
presumably served their purpose in routing out deeply entrenched,
self-perpetuating bias. Such bias would have kept Barack Obama
from even attending Harvard Law School, much less running for the
nation’s highest office. If the barriers that bias creates are
sufficiently diminished that he can become President, then the civil
rights laws should arguably conform to the nation’s new reality. A
postelection survey reveals that Barack Obama’s election to the
Presidency has led many Americans to assert that racism is less of a
problem in the United States and that policies designed to address
racial inequality might now be unnecessary.3
The wholesale repeal of the civil rights laws hardly seems
imminent. The current Congress has strengthened Title VII’s
protection against employment discrimination by extending the
statute of limitations for such actions.4 This legislation was a
response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., which imposed a strict 180-day statute of limitation on
these actions.5 As Ledbetter demonstrates, judicial rulings provide
the more likely route by which the rhetoric of a post-racial America
will have its bite. Even without Congress, the courts can chip away at
the protections that civil rights laws afford. Two of the Supreme
Court’s most notable cases in its recent term involved civil rights and

1. Individuals on the political right, such as Ward Connerly and Abigail Thernstrom,
argue that Barack Obama’s election is a significant step towards a post-racial America.
Cathy Young, Obama May Boost Foes of Affirmative Action, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009,
at 23. Even those on the political left raise similar prospects. As recent as March 2009,
with a photograph of President Obama, The American Prospect magazine’s cover story was
“Post-Racial. Really?: The NAACP Navigates the New Politics of Race.” AM. PROSPECT,
March 2009, at cover; see also Adam Serwer, The Other Black President: The NAACP
Confronts a New Political—and Racial—Era, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 2009, at 12.
2. Debate, Implicit Race Bias and the 2008 Presidential Election: Much Ado About
Nothing?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 210 (2009), available at http://
www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/ImplicitBias.pdf.
3. See Cheryl R. Kaiser et al., The Ironic Consequences of Obama’s Election:
Decreased Support for Social Justice, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 556, 557-58
(2009) (finding through a longitudinal study that after Obama’s election, “participants . . .
expressed less support for policies that address injustice such as affirmative action”).
4. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
5. 550 U.S. 618, 646 (2007).
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employment discrimination.6 President Obama’s success creates the
kind of background that might justify a retrenchment to some
members of the Court. Furthermore, the fact that a black President
now governs America will likely influence how district and appellate
court judges (not to mention jurors) assess such cases.
Whether the United States has entered a true post-racial
environment or not, the era of widespread, explicit bigotry is largely
over. But we believe that civil rights laws remain essential and,
ironically, the 2008 election demonstrates why. Contemporary racism
tends not to take the same overt, virulent forms that it took in
decades past. Rather, it tends to be subtle—even unconscious.7 Civil
rights laws and jurisprudence are designed to combat overt
discrimination but function poorly as remedies for subtle,
unconscious racism.8 Unfortunately, uncovering convincing evidence
that unconscious racism influences society at large has proven
difficult, thereby impeding the drive for making over
antidiscrimination laws. The 2008 election, however, provides
evidence for the widespread existence of unconscious racism, as well
as a case study in how it functions.
In this Article, we argue that the 2008 election shows that voting
rights and employment discrimination laws must continue to
embrace active, vibrant methods of combating unconscious bias if
they are to accomplish their stated goals. The principles of open
access to the polls and workplaces free from discrimination are likely
to remain enshrined in American law for some time to come. The
election of a black President, however, might suggest that racial
gerrymandering has become unnecessary and that efforts to use Title
VII to combat anything other than overtly racist practices in the
workplace are unnecessary. We contend that the 2008 election shows
nothing of the sort. Rather, we argue the 2008 election shows how
that invigorated versions of these mechanisms are essential to
combating the implicit racism that continues to influence elections
and the workplace.
To make our case, we use the 2008 election as a case study,
relying on a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods.9
6. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (involving employment discrimination);
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) (involving
voting rights).
7. See infra Section II.A.
8. See infra Section II.B.
9. Gregory S. Parks & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Barack Obama’s Candidacy and the
Collateral Consequences of the “Politics of Fear,” in BARACK OBAMA AND AFRICAN
AMERICAN EMPOWERMENT (Manning Marable & Kristen Clarke eds., 2009) [hereinafter
Parks & Rachlinski, Obama’s Candidacy]; Gregory S. Parks & Quinetta M. Roberson,
“Eighteen Million Cracks”: Gender’s Role in the 2008 Presidential Campaign, WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
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We assess polling numbers, news accounts, and campaign rhetoric to
contrast the election with the contemporary psychological research
on how modern racism functions. We then assess what this means for
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
At the outset, we note that we are concentrating specifically on
biases against black Americans, as opposed to other races, and as
opposed to gender bias. The 2008 election raised some of these issues,
especially gender, but the use of the Obama campaign as a case study
means that the clearest observations arise concerning biases against
black Americans.
II. THE 2008 ELECTION AND RACE AT THE BALLOT BOX
The 2009 “Beer Summit” at the White House with President
Obama, Professor Henry Louis Gates, and Office James Crowley (the
Cambridge police officer who had arrested Gates for disorderly
conduct) surely stands among the oddest examples of what might be
meant by a “Post-Racial America.”10 In years past, Crowley’s arrest
might have followed a standard, pessimistic racial script in which a
racist police force harasses a successful black man. It would have
produced defensive reactions from police, outrage from the black
leaders, lawsuits, or even riots. The script today is more complicated.
Officer Crowley works for a black police chief in a state governed by a
black governor in a country with a black President. In President
Obama’s America, the story ends with handshakes over beer in the
Rose Garden, rather than with litigation and violence. Does a country
where voters elect black people to high public offices such as police
chief, Governor, and President really need the protections of the
Voting Rights Act?
We doubt that anyone would argue seriously that President
Obama’s success suggests that efforts to provide equal or widespread
access to the polls are unnecessary. Elections remain marked by
unfortunate,
sporadic
instances
of
fraud
and
voter
disenfranchisement that continue to demand attention at the state
and federal levels.11 But the Voting Rights Act goes beyond efforts to
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1297340; Gregory S. Parks, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Richard A.
Epstein, Debate, Implicit Race Bias and the 2008 Presidential Election: Much Ado About
Nothing?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 210 (2009), available at http://
www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/ImplicitBias.pdf; Gregory S. Parks & Quinetta M.
Roberson, Michelle Obama: A Contemporary Analysis of Race and Gender Discrimination
Through the Lens of Title VII, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3 (2009) [hereinafter Parks &
Roberson, Michelle Obama].
10. The “Summit” was widely reported. See, e.g., Helene Cooper & Abby Goodnough,
Over Beers, No Apologies, but Plans to Have Lunch, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/us/politics/31obama.html.
11. See HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX 11-26 (2009) (giving examples of
difficulties occurring during elections).
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ensure access to the polls to all eligible voters. The Act facilitates,
and even demands, a degree of gerrymandering designed to ensure
that minority groups, especially black Americans, will find electoral
success through the creation of districts that are disproportionately
composed of minorities.12 The wisdom of this kind of racial
gerrymandering remains the source of heated debate.13 Although it
allows minority politicians to succeed, it arguably also dilutes the
influence of minority voters overall by concentrating their interests
into a few districts.14 The success of black politicians like President
Obama and Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick arguably
provides evidence that white voters will vote for minority candidates,
undermining the foundational assumptions of racial gerrymandering.
President Obama and Governor Patrick’s electoral victories,
however, convey a misleading impression. As we discuss in this
Section, the success of black politicians has been tied closely to the
presence of black voters. The 2008 electoral cycle was not
exceptional. Voting patterns in the United States remain wildly
racially stratified. Furthermore, as we discuss below, modern
campaign rhetoric promotes this stratification. Few black politicians
would enjoy any measure of success without racial gerrymandering.
In short, President Obama is nearly unique, and it would be
inappropriate to found changes in election law on his success.
A. Black Political Success and Black Voters
The success of black politicians has always depended upon the
franchise and political engagement of black voters. Just after the
Civil War, Congress’ passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, the
Enforcement Act, and the Force Act first set black political power in
motion.15 South Carolina offered an early example of what this large
and newly motivated black population could accomplish. In 1870,
black politicians attained three congressional seats, four of the state’s
eight executive offices, and a seat on the State Supreme Court.16
Throughout the South, black politicians took advantage of the
political climate of reconstruction to achieve high office, including

12. See Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734, 743
(2008) (discussing the role of racial gerrymandering under the Voting Rights Act).
13. See id. at 744.
14. See id. at 744-45.
15. See BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR
VOTING EQUALITY 5 (1992); DAVID MICHAEL HUDSON, ALONG RACIAL LINES:
CONSEQUENCES OF THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT 15 (David A. Schultz, ed., 1998); Sheryll
D. Cashin, Democracy, Race, and Multiculturalism in the Twenty-First Century: Will the
Voting Rights Act Ever Be Obsolete?, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 71, 75-76 (2006).
16. Cashin, supra note 15, at 76-77.
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three positions in the United States Senate. By 1875, Congress had
eight black members.17
Suffrage proved to be an ephemeral right for black Americans,
however.18 The end of Reconstruction also signaled the end of
suffrage for black voters and the demise of black political power. The
election of 1876 saw the number of black members of Congress drop
into the single digits.19 It fell to zero by 1902 and stayed there until
1928.20 The number of black congressional members did not reach
double digits again until 1969,21 four years after the passage of the
Voting Rights Act.
With the advent of the Voting Rights Act, black political
participation in elected office again began to grow. Unlike previous
civil rights legislation, the Voting Rights Act gave the attorney
general and the courts broad powers to grant relief wherever the
court found Fifteenth Amendment violations. The Act contained this
enforcement mechanism “to ensure the administration of a
discrimination-free electoral process.”22 The Act also established
“mechanisms or ‘special provisions’ to monitor certain states and
counties, and it created a triggering mechanism to bring most of the
17. Black Americans in Congress, Historical Data, Black-American Representatives and
Senators, 1870—Present, 44th Congress, 1875-1877, http://baic.house.gov/historicaldata/representatives-senators-by-congress.html?congress=44 (last visited July 30, 2010) [hereinafter Black Americans, 44th Congress]. There were a total of sixteen black congressmen
from 1869 to 1877. Black Americans in Congress, Historical Data, Black-American Representatives and Senators, 1870—Present, 41st Congress, 1869-1871, http://baic.house.gov/
historical-data/representatives-senators-by-congress.html?congress=41 (last visited July 30,
2010); Black Americans in Congress, Historical Data, Black-American Representatives and
Senators, 1870—Present,42nd Congress, 1871-1873, http://baic.house.gov/historical-data/
representatives-senators-by-congress.html?congress=42 (last visited July 30, 2010); Black
Americans in Congress, Historical Data, Black-American Representatives and Senators,
1870—Present,43rd
Congress,
1873-1875,
http://baic.house.gov/historical-data/
representatives-senators-by-congress.html?congress=43 (last visited July 30, 2010); Black
Americans, 44th Congress, supra.
18. For an account of the multitude of factors that lead to black disenfranchisement,
see HUDSON, supra note 15, at 7, 16-17; V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND
NATION 555-643 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1949); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 28-31
(2004); Cashin, supra note 15, at 80.
19. Black Americans in Congress, Black-American Representatives and Senators by
Congress, 1870–Present, 45th Congress, 1877-1879, http://baic.house.gov/historical-data/
representatives-senators-by-congress.html?congress=45 (last visited July 30, 2010).
20. Black Americans in Congress, Black-American Representatives and Senators by
Congress, 1870–Present, 57th Congress, 1901-1903, http://baic.house.gov/historicaldata/representatives-senators-by-congress.html?congress=57 (last visited July 30, 2010);
see Black Americans in Congress, Black-American Representatives and Senators by Congress, 1870–Present, 71st Congress, 1929-1931, http://baic.house.gov/historicaldata/representatives-senators-by-congress.html?congress=71 (last visited July 30, 2010).
21. See CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, AFRICAN AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS: 1870-2008, (2008), available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/
resources/pdf/RL30378.pdf.
22. HUDSON, supra note 15, at 55.
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South under federal monitoring and the special provisions of
enforcement.”23 These efforts worked hand-in-hand with voter
registration campaigns throughout the South to revitalize black
voters. Renewed participation by black voters, combined with explicit
racial gerrymandering to produce voting districts with
disproportionately large black populations, facilitated the election of
black politicians. Beginning in the 1970s, the number of black
politicians in former confederate states elected to state and federal
legislatures grew from less than fifty to more than 100 and reached
almost 200 by the late 1980s.24 The success of black politicians has
thus always been tied to the legal protection of black voters.
An examination of the 2008 election reveals that the Presidential
race was a salient anomaly that has not changed the tight
relationship between black political engagement and the success of
black politicians. The same election that produced the nation’s first
black President continued the tradition of overwhelmingly racial
voting patterns in the national legislature. The demographics of
the House of Representatives are the product of racial
gerrymandering and overwhelmingly racially stratified voting. The
2008 election sent thirty-nine black representatives to the 111th
Congress.25 Blacks make up, on average, 48.4% of the population in
these thirty-nine congressional districts.26 In contrast, the 396 other
districts have populations that are an average of 8.7% black. Even
these statistics understate the racial divide, however. Among the
thirty-nine congressional districts that have black populations of
one-third or more, thirty-two, or 82.1% have black representatives.
The other 396 districts have only seven, or 1.8%, representatives
who are black. Only one district (Minnesota’s Fifth, which is 12.7%
black) has a demographic makeup that is less than the nationwide black population (12.8%) and yet has a black representative.
Among the 313 districts with smaller black populations, not one has
a black representative.
The demography of congressional districts is no accident. Explicit
racial gerrymandering is largely responsible for the creation of
23. Id.
24. Id. at 17 fig.1.
25. This information was taken from the website of the Congressional Black Caucus.
Congressional Black Caucus—Member Information, http://cbc.lee.house.gov/members/
officers.shtml (last visited July 30, 2010); see also Black Americans in Congress, Black-American
Representatives and Senators by Congress, 1870–Present, 111th Congress, 2009-2011,
http://baic.house.gov/historical-data/representatives-senators-by-congress.html?congress=111.
This number excludes the six non-voting representatives, which include two black members
from the Virgin Islands and the District of Columbia.
26. The demographic information in this Section, including Table 1, comes from the
website of United States Census Bureau. U.S. Census Bureau, Congressional District
Data, http://www.census.gov/rdo/data/congressional_district_data.html (last visited July
30, 2010).
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thirty-nine congressional districts that have large black populations.
Because the demographics of the districts vary enormously, even if
voters select representatives from the population in the district
without regards to race, some districts would be more likely than
others to have black representatives. For example, the First
Congressional District of Illinois (currently represented by former
Black Panther, Bobby Rush) is 65.1% black. Hence, if race played no
role in the availability of candidates or the election process, the
district would have a 65.1% chance of having a black representative.
At the other end of the scale, only 0.25% of Wisconsin’s Seventh
Congressional District (currently represented by Dave Obey) is black,
and hence it would only have a 0.25% chance of having a black
representative if race played no role.
Figure 1, below, demonstrates that the disparities in selection
cannot be explained by variations in the demographics of the
congressional districts. This figure breaks the 435 congressional
districts into ten roughly equal groups,27 ordered by the percentage of
the district that is black, from highest to lowest. For example, the
forty-four districts that have the highest percentage of blacks (on the
left part of the graph), on average, have a black population of 51.1%.
These forty-four districts are represented by thirty-three black
representatives (75%), and eleven non-black representatives. As
Figure 1 shows, black representatives are highly concentrated in the
districts with the highest concentrations of black voters. Additionally,
there are no black representatives representing any district in the
bottom seven deciles of percent of black population, even though
there remain sizeable numbers of black voters in these districts.

27. To use only even numbers, every other decile, starting with the second, is 43, as
opposed to 44, districts.
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Figure 1: Percentage of Black Representatives and Percentage of Population that
Is Black Among Congressional Districts, by Decile of Black Population
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The racial disparity in this graph cannot be explained by chance.28
The ability of black candidates to get elected to the House of
Representatives depends entirely on having a large percentage of
black voters in a congressional district. The statistics even reveal a
distinct tipping point. Black candidates represent most of the
districts with a black population greater than one-third; non-black
candidates represent nearly all of the districts with black populations
less than one-third. A one-third tipping point is consistent with the
following simple pattern: black voters nearly unanimously support
black candidates; half of non-black voters vote nearly unanimously
against black candidates; and the remaining half of the non-black
voters divide on political issues. That highly racially stratified voting
pattern would produce, nearly precisely, the racial composition of the
House in exactly the same election that produced the nation’s first
black President.
Other factors are also apt to be at work, of course. Incumbency
matters enormously. In 2008, 378 of the 397 incumbents running for
re-election, or 95.2%, succeeded (thirty-six incumbents left the
House, due to retiring, running for other office, or losing the primary
election).29 Among the black representatives, only William Jefferson
28. If race played no role in voters’ electoral decisions, then we assumed that the percentage of the population that is black in the 44 Congressional Districts with the highest
percentage of black residents (22.48 percent) would produce 10 Representatives who are
black (.2248 multiplied by 44, rounded off). Likewise, the remaining 391 Districts, which
consist of 3.45% black residents, should produce 14 black Representatives (.0345 multiplied
by 391, rounded off). The actual numbers, 33 and 6, respectively, are highly unlikely to be
achieved by chance. ǘ2(1) = 57.4, p < .001.
29. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2008: U.S. SENATE AND U.S. HOUSE
RESULTS 79, available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/2008congresults.pdf (last visited July
30, 2010); Greg Giroux, Incumbents Defeated in General Elections, 1968-2008,
http://www.cqpolitics.com/cq-assets/eap/campaigns/girouxgems/DefeatedInGeneralElections.pdf
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(who was under a federal indictment for bribery)30 of Louisiana lost
his bid for re-election in 2008.31 But outside of President Obama,
2008 was no watershed year for black politicians. The election
maintained a highly stratified status quo.
Party matters too, of course. Black voters are easily the
Democratic Party’s most reliable contingent,32 making race
impossible to disentangle completely from party. Accounting for
party thus only redirects the analysis to assessing why black
candidates succeed overwhelmingly and exclusively in primary
elections in black districts. Districts that are more than one-third
black also tend to be dominated by democrats. Due to the fact that
black voters are overwhelmingly democratic, they make up a
majority of the voters in the democratic primary elections in these
districts. If black voters heavily favor black candidates in primary
elections, then black politicians will theoretically win both the
primary (due to black favoritism) and the general election (due to the
dominance of the Democratic Party in that district). Favoritism for
black candidates might thereby combine with black voter clustering
in the Democratic Party to explain the extraordinary success of black
politicians in districts with large numbers of black voters. The
extraordinary lack of success of black politicians in districts where
white voters are more prevalent, however, signals that white
voters—even Democrats—disfavor black candidates.
The United State Senate provides the clearest test of the effects of
racial gerrymandering. Unlike congressional districts, the states are
not gerrymandered by race. Black politicians seeking to serve in the
Senate generally face an electorate that has few black voters. Only
Mississippi has a population that is more than one-third black
(37.2%).33 Several other Southern states have sizeable black
populations,34 but the black population in all those states falls below
(last visited July 30, 2010); The Cook Political Report, 2008 House Summary, Aug. 21, 2008,
http://www.cookpolitical.com/charts/house/summary_2008-08-21_13-30-19.php.
30. Joel Roberts, Rep. Jefferson Indicted in Bribery Case, CBS NEWS: POLITICS, June
4, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/06/04/politics/main2882231.shtml.
31. Republican Vietnamese-American Ahn “Joseph” Cao defeated him in the general
election. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, supra note 29, at 113. Ohio’s 11th District changed from
one black Representative to another, as Marcia Fudge won the seat previously held by the
late Stephanie Tubbs Jones, who died on August 20, 2008. Id. at 145.
32. Rod Young, African American Voting Patterns: Black Voting Demographics 2008
Democratic Primary Statistics, Aug. 7, 2008, http://racism-politics.suite101.com/article.cfm/
african_american_voting_patterns.
33. U.S. Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts: Mississippi,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/28000.html (last visited July 30, 2010).
34. For example, Alabama has a black population of 26.4%, Georgia has a black population of 30%, Louisiana has a black population of 32%, and South Carolina has a black
population of 28.5%. U.S. Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts: Alabama,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/01000.html (last visited July 30, 2010); U.S. Census
Bureau, State and County Quick Facts: Georgia, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
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the one-third cutoff that seems critical to black political success.
Black politicians do not fare well in Senatorial elections. The only
sitting black Senator is Roland Burris, who was appointed to serve
out President Obama’s term in Illinois.35 Furthermore, Barack
Obama was only the third black politician elected to the Senate in
America’s history (although two others before Senator Burris have
been appointed to serve).36 Without the intervention of the Voting
Rights Act and racial gerrymandering, the House would presumably
be no different.
Despite the legal efforts aimed at ensuring black political
participation, law alone cannot change human behavior. Brown v.
Board of Education37 overturned Plessy v. Ferguson’s38 “separate but
equal” doctrine as it related to public education, but the change in
law that the decision announced did little to alter the underlying
attitudes that produced segregation.39 Indeed, widespread
segregation in schools remains the norm, even fifty years later.40
Likewise, despite the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, the
enactment of the Voting Rights Act and the subsequent rise in the
number of black elected officials, racism has persisted in the
American political process. Recent history, too, suggests that political
candidates’ race has long predicted whether voters would elect them
to office. Merely protecting access to the polls is not enough to ensure
black political success. Even in 2008, the active intervention of racial
gerrymandering remains an essential measure to overcoming racial
voting patterns.
B. Racial Messages in Modern Political Campaigns
Why do racial voting patterns persist in an electorate that largely
denounces the influence of race at the polls? While many factors
contribute to the persistence of racial voting patterns, political
states/13000.html (last visited July 30, 2010); U.S. Census Bureau, State and County
Quick Facts: Louisiana, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22000.html (last visited July
30, 2010); U.S. Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts: South Carolina,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/45000.html (last visited July 30, 2010).
35. Black Wall Street District, Past & Current African American Senators,
http://blackwallstreet.org/blk.resources.dir/goc.html (last visited July 30, 2010).
36. Id.
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
39. Laura Bacon, Note, Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey: Creating a Meaningful Choice for
Housing Choice Voucher Holders, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1273, 1275 (2006) (“But progress
through the law can only truly make a difference if the underlying discriminatory attitudes
change as well.”).
40. See generally BARRY A. GOLD, STILL SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: SEGREGATION AND
THE FUTURE OF URBAN SCHOOL REFORM (2007) (arguing that “racially separate schools
cannot be equal even if funding levels are the same as wealthy White school districts”);
JONATHAN KOZOL, THE SHAME OF THE NATION: THE RESTORATION OF APARTHEID
SCHOOLING IN AMERICA (2006).
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leaders must accept some of the blame. Overt racism is no longer a
strategy that national leaders employ. Subtle messages that fan
lingering racial animosity, however, still commonly animate modern
campaign strategies. Voters’ perceptions about race influence how
they cast their ballots, and white politicians also have long used
veiled racism as a way to swing voters or to get white voters out to
the polls.41
Richard Nixon’s 1968 campaign provided perhaps the first
blueprint for a modern political campaign in the United States.42
Included in the Nixon campaign’s pioneering efforts in the art of spin
was the use of racial messages that quietly harnessed the racial
mood among white voters.43 The campaign promised “law and order,”
which many saw as code for cracking down on black militants.44 The
campaign solicited supporters to show up at Nixon rallies to shout
racial epithets so candidate Nixon could disparage the explicit
expression of racism.45 This tactic had a double message for white
voters. To those who disdained explicit racism, Nixon could be seen
as espousing a reasonably progressive message that racism was
morally wrong. To those who harbored racist sentiment, the presence
of the supporter at the campaign was evidence that like-minded
voters supported Nixon.
Many Republicans since Nixon maintained a drumbeat of covert
racial messages in campaigns. When Ronald Reagan spoke of supposed
“Welfare Queens” who game the system, voters knew what he meant.46
This latter imagery melded the Republicans’ focus on lower taxes and
smaller government with whites’ racial animosity. The message to
whites was implicit but clear: your taxes are high because Lyndon
Johnson’s programs are funneling your money to undeserving black
women. These seemingly race-neutral campaign themes, welfare and
crime, carry demonstrably racially loaded undertones.47
By the 1980’s, the Republican Party had completely undermined
the traditional Democratic support among Southern whites and labor
union members with these kinds of tactics. So successful were these
41. See KEITH REEVES, VOTING HOPES OR FEARS?: WHITE VOTERS, BLACK
CANDIDATES, AND RACIAL POLITICS IN AMERICA 3-90 (1997).
42. See JOE MCGINNISS, THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968 (1969).
43. See id. at 93-96 (discussing a development of a commercial for the Nixon campaign involving the Vietnam war with racial undertones).
44. Robert E. Weems, Jr. & Louis A. Randolph, The Ideological Origins of Richard M.
Nixon’s “Black Capitalism” Initiative, 29 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 49, 53 (2001).
45. MCGINNISS, supra note 42, at 93.
46. Paul Krugman, Republicans and Race, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/opinion/19krugman.html.
47. See Jon Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, Public Perceptions of Race and Crime: The Role
of Racial Stereotypes, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 375, 383-91 (1997); Fred Slocum, White Racial
Attitudes and Implicit Racial Appeals: An Experimental Study of “Race Coding” in Political
Discourse, 29 POL. & POL’Y 650 (2001).
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efforts that by 1985, the National Democratic Party openly sponsored
research to discern why so many working-class white voters had
abandoned their traditional support for the party.48 After conducting
significant research on the subject, pollster Stanley Greenberg
attributed the defection to dissatisfaction with the Democratic
Party’s increasing association with black voters.49 White defectors
expressed a profound distaste for black voters and issues important
to black voters. Their racial sentiments greatly affected how white
defectors felt about government and politics.50 For these voters,
blacks constituted an explanation for “almost everything that ha[d]
gone wrong in their lives.”51 They perceived blacks as a “serious
obstacle to their personal advancement.”52 Not being black relegated
them to lower middle-class status. Not living near blacks made their
neighborhoods decent places to live.53 It is no surprise that such
voters repudiated the Democratic Party and developed such
hardened racial attitudes. Just as whites moved to the suburbs to
flee increasing integration in urban public schools, so too did many
abandon the increasingly integrated Democratic Party. In effect,
latent racism combined with the tone of political campaigns to create
and maintain subtle racially charged voting patterns.
As overt racism became increasingly taboo, white politicians
continued to appeal to white voters’ concerns through subtle
overtures.54 In 1988, a group that supported George H. W. Bush’s
presidential campaign ran a highly controversial ad that baited white
fears about young black male violence. The ads featured a sinister
image of Willie Horton, a black escapee from Massachusetts who fled
to Maryland and broke into a white couple’s home. There, Horton
stabbed the husband and raped the wife. In addition to emphasizing
Horton’s crimes, the ads also “attacked Democratic presidential
candidate Michael Dukakis (then governor of Massachusetts) for the
weekend release program under which Horton had fled the state.”55
Republican political operatives knew that the Horton ad would use
continuing racism as a way to win white support.56
48. Frederick Slocum & Yeuh-Ting Lee, Racism, Racial Stereotypes, and American
Politics, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 62 (Jean Lau Chin ed.,
2004) [hereinafter PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION] (citing STANLEY B. GREENBERG,
REPORT ON DEMOCRATIC DEFECTION 13-18, 28 (The Analysis Group, 1985)).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See generally TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, IMPLICIT
MESSAGES, AND THE NORM OF EQUALITY 143 (2001) (noting the success of Nixon’s strategy
to win over the South in his presidential campaign using implicit racial messages).
55. PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION, supra note 48, at 72-73.
56. MENDELBERG, supra note 54, at 143-44.
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When Jesse Helms, a white Senator from North Carolina, faced a
black challenger, Harvey Gantt, in 1990, few were surprised that
race played a role in Helms’ ultimate victory. In the race, Helms
raised several issues tied to race, including his allegation that Gantt
favored quotas that would benefit blacks.57 “One of Helms’
advertisements showed the hands of a white person crumpling a
rejection letter. ‘You needed that job,’ the announcer says. ‘And you
were the best-qualified. But they had to give it to a minority because
of a racial quota. Is that really fair?’ ”58 The ad was broadcast just a
few days shy of the election and boosted Helms to victory in an
election that had been a dead heat.59
Politicians have even found ways to fan racial animosity even in
elections between white candidates. During the 2000 presidential
primaries, Karl Rove masterminded a much-needed victory for
George W. Bush during his South Carolina primary with a campaign
that featured a quiet racial attack. Rove strategically used
“whispered innuendos,” one of them being “that John McCain
fathered a black child out of wedlock.”60 People in some areas of
South Carolina received phone calls in which self-proclaimed
pollsters would ask, “Would you be more likely or less likely to vote
for John McCain for president if you knew he had fathered an
illegitimate black child?”61 This was likely a reference to Bridget, a
darker-skinned child whom the McCains had adopted as a baby from
an orphanage in Bangladesh.62 “Richard Hand, a professor at Bob
Jones University, sent an e-mail message to ‘fellow South
Carolinians’ telling recipients that Mr. McCain had ‘chosen to sire
children without marriage.’ ”63
Before the 2008 campaign, the most recent attempt at subtle
racial appeals in a prominent election occurred during the 2006 U.S.
Senate race in Tennessee. “[I]n a tight race between Bob Corker
[white] and Rep. Harold Ford, an African American, the Republican
National Committee played the race card.”64 A television ad, funded
by the Republican National Convention (“RNC”), insinuated an

57. Peter Appleborne, Racial Politics Surfaces Again in Some Races in Southern
States, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 7, 1990, at 8C.
58. Id.
59. PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION, supra note 48, at 72.
60. Bill Curry, Rove Leaves Long Trail of Dirty Tricks, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 19,
2007, at C3.
61. Jennifer Steinhauer, Confronting Ghosts of 2000 in South Carolina, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 2007, at 1.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Jesse Jackson, Does GOP Mean Gutter-Oriented Politics?, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct.
31, 2006, at 27.
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intimate relationship between Ford and a white woman.65 The ad’s
hardest-hitting jab came from the mouth of a scantily clad white
woman, who says she met Harold “at the Playboy party,” casting a
flirtatious look into the camera. Then as the ad draws to an end, the
woman says, “Harold, call me.”66 That dig was meant to remind
people that Ford attended a 2005 Super Bowl party sponsored by
Playboy. But it was also meant to suggest that the black
congressman had gotten too familiar with a white woman.67 Hilary
Shelton, head of the Washington office of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”), said the ad
“contradicted the spirit of remarks delivered at last year’s NAACP
convention by the Republican National Committee chairman, Ken
Mehlman, in which he decried those in his party who had tried to
‘benefit politically from racial polarization.’ ”68 The NAACP also said
that the ad played “on fears of interracial relationships to scare some
white voters in rural Tennessee to oppose . . . Ford.”69
The continued racial overtones of heated political campaigns have
likely helped maintain racially stratified voting patterns. Race
baiting splits white and black voters. The subtle use of racial cues
capitalizes on lingering racial attitudes to attract white voters. To the
extent it works, it repels black voters. The contrast of occasional,
explicit racism exhibited by a fringe candidate or supporter also
makes the subtler message seem measured and acceptable. The
political dynamic creates an equilibrium wherein one candidate or
another will periodically try to attract white voters with racial
messages that make subtle racism acceptable and widespread in
political life.
C. Racial Messages in the 2008 Presidential Campaign
Does the election of Barack Obama change the equilibrium? We
think not. The 2008 campaign lacked messages as blunt as those in
the past, but it was not free from racial imagery. An analysis of the
words, images, and symbols of the campaigns reveals that several
racial themes emerged, some of which follow the script of racially
coded messages laid down by past campaigns. These scripts took
advantage of latent negative associations many white Americans
harbor towards black Americans just as past campaigns have done.70
Other comments and themes (mostly from supporters or fringe
65. Id.; Peter Wallsten, Democrats Say GOP Ad Appeals to Racist Fears, BUFFALO
NEWS, Oct. 24, 2006, at A5.
66. Jackson, supra note 64; Wallsten, supra note 65.
67. Wallsten, supra note 65.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Parks & Rachlinski, Obama’s Candidacy, supra note 9.
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groups) represent explicit racism. We identify and discuss these
themes below.
1. Too Black
One early concern about Candidate Obama was that he might be
“too black.” In the growing body of research on the nature of racial bias
in American in the twenty-first century, the main finding (which we
discuss below) is that a large number of white Americans associate
black Americans with a range of negative concepts.71 The research also
shows, however, that these negative associations are directed at black
Americans who appear the most stereotypically black. For example,
priming police officers with violent imagery causes them to make
mistakes in a lineup that favor picking out suspects who are rated as
more “stereotypically Black.”72 Worse yet, juries are more likely to
sentence black defendants who look more “stereotypically Black” to
death in capital cases than those who look less stereotypically black in
cases involving white victims.73 The Clinton campaign, in fact, took the
obvious tack that this research tone suggests by airing a television
advertisement that darkened the tone of Senator Obama’s skin,
thereby making him look more stereotypically black.74 The ad was a
none-too-subtle effort to make Senator Obama appear more black, and
(to white Americans) more menacing.75
Candidate Obama’s opponents also found that events could help
them move some voters to conclude that Senator Obama seemed too
black politically. Minister Louis Farrakhan, during the Nation of
Islam’s Savior’s Day gathering in 2008, publicly praised Senator
Obama,76 forcing Senator Obama to publicly “reject and denounce”
Minister Farrakhan’s support.77 Senator Obama’s association with
Reverend Jeremiah Wright proved to be the best opportunity for the
Clinton campaign to change the way Americans saw Senator
Obama.78 Senator Obama was roundly criticized for his long-standing
relationship with Reverend Wright—whom many white voters and
71. See infra Part. III.A (discussing implicit racial bias).
72. See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual
Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 885-87 (2004).
73. See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality
of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383,
383 (2006).
74. Bill Sanderson, Shady TV Ad Darkens ‘O’ —Clinton Sparks Huetube Ruckus, N.Y.
POST, Mar. 5, 2008, at 008.
75. Id.
76. Margaret Ramirez, Farrakhan Sings Obama’s Praises—Senator Has Criticized
Him, Says Support Not Sought, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 2008, at 1.
77. Steven Thomma, Pivotal Debate a Crackling Exchange, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 27,
2008, at 1A.
78. Brian DeBose, Divisive Minister is Kept at a Distance, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2008, at A01.
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political pundits came to view as racist, militant, and unpatriotic.79
The Clinton campaign needed little help here, as an endless loop of
sound bites of Reverend Wright’s controversial statements appeared
on YouTube and cable television.80
The association with Reverend Wright did real damage to
Candidate Obama’s campaign. He was forced to respond in a widely
publicized speech on race in Philadelphia. This speech drew praise
from many quarters, but it did little to assuage concerns among
many white voters.81 After the emergence of Reverend Wright,
Candidate Obama fared poorly among white voters in the remaining
Democratic primaries, even though he ultimately disavowed
Reverend Wright. For many white Americans, this association may
have made him too black to be President. None of the associations
that some white candidates in both parties have had with radical or
controversial clergy have hurt their political standing to the extent
that Obama’s association with Reverend Wright hurt his campaign.82
Reverend Wright is simply too black for white Americans.
The McCain campaign chose not to re-raise Reverend Wright in
the fall campaign.83 Instead, they tried to tie Senator Obama to
former Weather Underground leader Bill Ayers. Governor Palin was
the campaign’s primary mouthpiece for this effort, alleging that
Senator Obama “kicked off his political career, [sic] in the guy’s living
room.”84 The effort intended to blend two messages—terrorism and
that Candidate Obama posed a danger to America. The former is a
throwback to the 2004 Bush campaign’s efforts to appear stronger on
the terrorism issue than Senator John Kerry. Branding a candidate’s
policies as dangerous is standard fare, but attempting to make a
79. Id.
80. Amplifying Sound Bites from the Sermons, B. GLOBE, Apr. 29, 2008, at 6A.
81. Jake Tapper & Nitya Venkataraman, Obama Distances from Longtime Pastor in
Race Speech, ABC NEWS, Mar. 18, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Vote2008/
story?id=4469583.
82. Ironically, Senator Clinton had closer ties to Minister Farrakhan through her
surrogate, Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell, who publicly praised Minister Farrakhan
during the 1990s. Colbert I. King, Farrakhan’s Pennsylvania Admirer, WASH. POST, Apr.
26, 2008, at A17. Senator Clinton was also not subjected to much scrutiny when it was
revealed that former President Clinton had invited Reverend Wright to a White House
prayer breakfast in 1998. Clinton Criticizes Photo’s Release, TELEGRAPH HERALD, Mar. 22,
2008, at A7. Nor was Senator McCain criticized much for his endorsement by Reverend
John Hagee, who spoke favorably of Hitler and negatively against Catholics and
homosexuals. Juliet Eilperin & Kimberly Kindy, McCain Rejects Pastor’s Backing Over
Remarks, WASH. POST, May 23, 2008, at A1.
83. See Toby Harnden, John McCain Campaign Rules Out Using Jeremiah Wright
Against Barack Obama, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 8, 2008, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/
tobyharnden/5406868/John_McCain_campaign_rules_out_using_Jeremiah_Wright_against
_Barack_Obama.
84. Posting of Scott Conroy to From the Road, Palin: Obama Began His Political
Career in Terrorist’s Living Room,
http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2008/10/05/politics/
fromtheroad/entry4502414.shtml (Oct. 5, 2008, 13:56 EST).
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candidate seem personally dangerous is a novel tactic that plays off
of latent associations that most white Americans harbor between
black Americans and violence.
2. Primate Imagery
One of the ugliest aspects of the 2008 presidential campaign
included several incidents where voters likened the Obama’s to
various types of primates. First, in February 2008, one commenter on
The Huffington Post indicated that Ms. Obama was reminiscent of
Zira—one of the characters from Planet of the Apes.85 Three months
later, a white Georgia bar and grill owner began selling T-shirts at
his establishment depicting the image of Curious George, a cartoon
monkey, with the slogan “Obama in ‘08.”86 Then in June, a Utah
company began making a sock monkey (doll) of Senator Obama.87
These efforts arise from the latent associations many white
Americans harbor between blacks and apes. In one study of this
relationship, individuals were subliminally shown images of black
faces, white faces, or neutral images.88 Then they were shown fuzzy
images of animals (apes and non-apes), which gradually became
clearer. Individuals were instructed to indicate the point at which
they could identify the image. Individuals more easily identified ape
images when primed (subliminally shown images) with black male
faces than when not so primed. Moreover, individuals found it more
difficult to identify ape images when primed with white male faces.89
In a second study, individuals primed with images of apes more
closely attended to black faces than white faces, as compared to those
individuals primed with jumbled line drawings.90 Another study
showed that white males implicitly associate African Americans with
apes, as opposed to cats and other animals, even though these
participants denied awareness of the stereotype “African Americans
are like apes.”91 The results suggest that although the black-primate
association is common, it may operate outside of “explicit cultural
knowledge of the association.”92

85. Comment by mcnairbo on Michelle Obama Predicts Ohio Victory, HUFFINGTON
POST, Feb. 15, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/02/15/michelle-obama-predictso_n_86896.html.
86. Bo Emerson, Politically Correct? Not This Bar Owner, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May
15, 2008, at B1.
87. Doll “Pure Racism,” GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, June 15, 2008, at A4.
88. Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical
Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
292, 295 (2008).
89. Id. at 296.
90. Id. at 298.
91. Id. at 301.
92. Id.
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The major candidates and their principal surrogates avoided
making these associations during the campaign, as did the news
media. Even after the election, however, the New York Post
published a cartoon portraying President Obama as an ape.93
3. Slurs
The 2008 Presidential campaign also featured patently racially
derogatory terms and quasi-derogatory terms to describe candidate
Obama when viewed through a racial lens. Accordingly, white
politicians’ use of implicit anti-black bias predicts the use of
racial slurs.94
Early in the campaign, Hillary Clinton’s surrogate, Andrew
Cuomo, used the phrase “shuck and jive” to describe how candidates
evade questions from the press. Though he did not mention Obama
by name, many believed he was referring to Obama.95 Additionally,
Republican Congressman Tom Davis, in discussing how Senator
Obama would have difficulty handling the immigration debate,
described this issue as a “tar baby.”96 Arguably, Representative
Davis’ statement was not racially tinged, although he has a history of
making similar statements.97
Obama also received a considerable amount of criticism after he
referenced some working-class voters’ frustration with the economy.
He noted, “[i]t’s not surprising, then, they get bitter, they cling to guns
or religion or antipathy to people who aren’t like them or antiimmigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment as a way to explain their
frustrations.”98 Senator Clinton used this statement to charge Senator
Obama with being elitist.99 What was striking about such a critique is
that Senator Obama was raised in poverty by a single mother and then
by his grandparents. And despite his Columbia University and

93. Oliver Burkeman, New York Post in Racism Row Over Chimpanzee Cartoon,
GUARDIAN
U.K.,
Feb.
18,
2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/18/
new-york-post-cartoon-race. For a closer analysis of the New York Post cartoon in the
context of the black (Obama)-primate association, see Gregory S. Parks & Danielle C.
Heard, “Assassinate the Nigger Ape[]:” Obama, Implicit Imagery, and the Dire
Consequences of Racist Jokes, Aug. 11, 2009, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1447572.
94. Laurie A. Rudman & Richard D. Ashmore, Discrimination and the Implicit
Association Test, 10 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 359, 361-63 (2007).
95. Robin Givhan, On the Subject of Race, Words Get in the Way, WASH. POST, Jan. 20,
2008, at M1.
96. GOP Rep. Uses Term ‘Tar Baby’ in Memo About Obama, Election, HUFFINGTON
POST, May 14, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/05/14/gop-rep-uses-term-tarbab_n_101793.html.
97. Adrienne T. Washington, To Tom Davis, with Friendly Persuasion, WASH. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 1994, at C2.
98. Tom Vanden Brook, Clinton Brands Obama’s Words as ‘Elitist, Divisive’ —Says
Rival’s Remarks Leave Him Open to Republican Attack, USA TODAY, Apr. 14, 2008, at 5A.
99. Id.
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Harvard Law degree, he and his wife had just paid off their student
loans relatively close to when he decided to run for the Presidency.100
This is in contrast to Senator Clinton (wife of a former President, Ivy
League educated, and multimillionaire)101 and Senator McCain
(husband of a multimillionaire and son of a Navy Admiral).102
Although the attack was arguably an effort to paint Senator Obama as
a Northeastern, ivory-tower liberal, it had other connotations given the
historic tendency among some white Americans to react negatively to
someone they consider an “uppity nigger.” Indeed, Obama was the only
presidential candidate openly criticized as “uppity.”103
Fringe groups also used a number of demeaning racial slurs
during the campaign. Near the end of the presidential campaign, the
Chaffey Community Republican Women, Federated sent out a
newsletter that depicted Barack Obama on a $10.00 “food stamp.”
Also on the food stamp was a bucket of KFC fried chicken, a piece of
watermelon, spare ribs, and a pitcher of Kool-Aid.104 The group’s
president, Diane Fedele, indicated that she had no idea why anyone
would take offense to the image, stating “[i]t was just food to me. It
didn’t mean anything else.”105
4. Foreign, Arab/Muslim
Candidate Obama continuously faced allegations that that he was
unpatriotic, un-American, and even a foreigner. These allegations
started early when he was criticized in the primaries based on false
allegations that he does not pledge allegiance to the American flag.
Such critiques stemmed from him not placing his hand over his heart
during the singing of the national anthem at an Iowa fair.106 In
addition, critics latched onto the fact that Obama had stopped
wearing an American flag pin on his lapel, despite arguing that he
believed some politicians used the flag pin as a hollow substitute for

100. Jill Abramson, Taking Aim at Elitism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2008, at A16.
101. Hillary Clinton Biograhy, http://www.biography.com/articles/Hillary-Clinton-9251306
(last visited July 30, 2010); Tim Middleton, Hillary Clinton: Midas Touch at Work, MSN
MONEY,
Sept.
4, 2007,
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/MutualFunds/
HillaryClintonMidasTouchAtWork.aspx.
102. Tony Allen-Mills, Flawed Cindy McCain Has a Grudge List, TIMES ONLINE, Feb.
3,
2008,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/us_elections/
article3295472.ece.
103. Laura Clawson, Salon: Obama Used to Be “Uppity,” Feb. 11, 2007,
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2007/2/11/223840/971.
104. Dan Bernstein, Coming to You in Stereotype, PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Oct. 17, 2008, at
C01; Colin Hickey, The Power of Images, MORNING SENTINEL, Nov. 2, 2008, at 1.
105. Bernstein, supra note 104.
106. Alec MacGillis, Obama Faces Test in Asserting His Own Brand of Patriotism,
WASH. POST, May 4, 2008, at A1.
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patriotic deeds.107 Because of such actions, critics—often white
voters—labeled Senator Obama as unpatriotic.108 By the time of the
Democratic National Convention, the Obama campaign seemed to
have concluded that a cold intellectual description of why he was not
wearing a flag was unwise and duly surrounded him with as many
American flags as would fit on every stage he entered.
Candidate Obama’s name, of course, made him vulnerable to
allusions of foreign loyalties or status, but his race also played a role
in this vulnerability. Many white Americans continue to associate
racial minorities with disloyalty. As recently as twenty years ago, a
poll indicated that 51% of non-black Americans believed that black
Americans are less patriotic than other racial groups.109 Such
attitudes remain pervasive at the unconscious level. In one recent
study, researchers found that college students more easily paired
American symbols with white faces rather than with black faces.110 In
another study, white and Asian Americans associated whites with
the “American” concept to a greater extent than blacks.111 Yet
another study showed that people associated eight white American
Olympic athletes more strongly with the category “American” than
eight black American Olympic athletes (even though the subjects in
the study were more familiar with the black athletes than the white
athletes).112 Furthermore, when whites and Asians are primed (where
individuals are subliminally shown images) with the American flag,
their attitudes toward black Americans become more negative.113
When whites and Asians are primed with images of the American
flag, their attitudes toward Democrats were not altered, but their
attitudes toward blacks generally, and Senator Obama specifically,
became more negative.114 A study conducted in December 2007
showed that people more easily associated Senator Clinton with the
category “American” than Senator Obama.115 That study also showed
that participants explicitly found Barack Obama more American
than Tony Blair. However, implicitly, the participants more strongly
107. Jeff Zeleny, The Politician and the Absent American Flag Pin, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
2007, at A22.
108. See id.; see also MacGillis, supra note 106.
109. STUDS TERKEL, RACE: HOW BLACKS & WHITES THINK & FEEL ABOUT THE
AMERICAN OBSESSION, at v (1992) (quoting a 1990 University of Chicago National Opinion
Research Center survey).
110. Thierry Devos & Mahzarin R. Banaji, American = White?, 88 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 447, 451-53 (2005).
111. Id. at 458-59.
112. Id. at 454-55.
113. Shanette C. Porter et al., The American Flag Increases Prejudice Toward AfricanAmericans (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors).
114. Id.
115. Thierry Devos et al., Is Barack Obama American Enough to Be the Next
President? The Role of Ethnicity and National Identity in American Politics,
http://www.rohan.sdsu.edu/~tdevos/thd/Devos_spsp2008.pdf (last visited July 30, 2010).
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associated pictures of white politicians with the “American” concept
than pictures of black politicians.116
In addition to equating Obama’s race with a lack of being
authentically American, critics have attempted to allude to his
middle name, Hussein, as another indicator that he is not
authentically American. Bill Cunningham, a conservative radio show
host and supporter of Senator McCain, revved-up a crowd before
Senator McCain’s appearance at a political rally by repeatedly
referred to Obama as “Barack Hussein Obama,” emphasizing his
middle name. 117 At a rally late in the campaign, an elderly McCain
supporter openly called Obama “an Arab.”118 Senator McCain
repudiated both of these remarks,119 but the events were reminiscent
of the Nixon campaign’s tactics. Although there is no evidence that
the McCain campaign scripted the event—and Senator McCain’s
rebukes seemed entirely sincere—these comments might have
reinforced the notion that Senator Obama was simply less American
than Senator McCain.
The latent sense that Barack Obama is not quite American has
not entirely dissipated with his election. In the summer of 2009, CNN
reporter Lou Dobbs began publicly questioning President Obama’s
citizenship.120 Dobbs is the most visible, mainstream source of this
rhetoric. The “Birthers,” radical conservatives who seek to prove
Barack Obama is ineligible to hold the office of President,121 began
appearing at town hall meetings of members of both parties during
2009, demanding an investigation into President Obama’s
citizenship.122 Health care protests during 2009 also focused on a
theme of “taking back America.” Rhetoric demanding that politicians
“take back our country” is not unique to President Obama—President
Bush attracted similar calls.123 Past demands to “take back America,”
however, have not been accompanied either by the emotional anger
that characterized many rallies this summer or by charges that the
116. Id.
117. Michael Luo, A Host Disparages Obama, and McCain Quickly Apologizes, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2008, at A20.
118. Jonathan Martin & Amie Parnes, McCain: Obama Not an Arab, Crowd Boos, Oct.
10, 2008, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1008/14479.html.
119. His response to the assertion that Senator Obama was an Arab was, “[n]o ma’am.
He’s a decent family man.” Id. We doubt that Senator McCain meant to indicate that no
Arab could be a decent family man, but it was an unfortunate choice of words.
120. Edward Wyatt, CNN President Says Obama Citizenship Issue is ‘Dead,’ but Lou
Dobbs Revives It, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2009, http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/07/28/cnn-president-says-obama-citizenship-issue-is-dead-but-lou-dobbs-revives-it.
121. Ben Smith, Culture of Conspiracy: The Birthers, POLITICO, Mar. 1, 2009,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0209/19450.html.
122. Mike Castle on Barack H. Obama Birth Certificate, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=9V1nmn2zRMc (last visited July 30, 2010).
123. See MICHAEL MOORE, DUDE, WHERE'S MY COUNTRY (2004).
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President is not a citizen. Just as black American Olympic athletes,
decked out in red, white, and blue uniforms, seem less American to
some than their white counterparts, apparently so too does a black
American President seem less American than his predecessors.
5. Interracial Taboo
Arguably, the most successful racial subtext that the McCain
campaign used was that of the interracial sexual taboo. In August of
2008, the McCain campaign ran an advertisement designed to use
Senator Obama’s growing celebrity status against him. The
advertisement called him “the world’s biggest celebrity” and featured
Paris Hilton and Britney Spears. The ostensible point of using these
two particular celebrities was to suggest they are vacuous, troubled
party girls, illustrating the idea that celebrity status does not equate
to the leadership skills needed to govern.124 But the world of
celebrities is filled with people who doubtless lack qualifications to
run the country. The use of these two blond, white women arguably
amounted to race-baiting. As one critic of the advertisement put it,
using Paris Hilton and Britney Spears “subliminally played on white
America’s fear of black men violating the delicate flowers of white
American womanhood.”125
Shortly after the advertisement began airing, Senator Obama
began to drop in the polls. By the end of August, Senator McCain had
erased Senator Obama’s large lead, and the campaign was too close
to call.126 What role the Hilton-Spears ad played in this is impossible
to say with certainty. The same month included the conventions and
the surprise announcement that Governor Palin would be Senator
McCain’s running mate. The interracial taboo remains powerful,
however, and cannot not easily be dismissed as a partial explanation
for the tightening of the electoral race during this period. As noted
above, the taboo was successfully used in the 2006 Tennessee Senate
race against Harold Ford. Although the fall campaign was generally
free of racial subtext, it seems unlikely that the McCain campaign
chose these two celebrities at random.
D. Conclusion
The creation of “minority” congressional districts is one of the
most controversial components of the Voting Rights Act. These
124. McCain
Ad
Calls
Obama
a
Celebrity,
http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=xmFrBaskrlQ (last visited July 30, 2010).
125. Jonah Goldberg, Media Play Race Card on Obama, REPUBLICAN-AMERICAN, Sept.
28, 2008, at 4D, available at http://article.nationalreview.com/372112/the-media-play-therace-card-on-obama/jonah-goldberg.
126. Gallup Daily: No Bounce for Obama in Post-Biden Tracking, GALLUP, Aug. 26, 2008,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/109834/gallup-daily-bounce-obama-post-biden-tracking.aspx.
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districts dilute the influence of minority voters by concentrating
them in a handful of districts, thereby allowing other representatives
to ignore the concerns of minorities. The application of the Voting
Rights Act to gerrymandering allows an unfortunate, heavy-handed
federal intrusion on a process that is historically local. The role of the
courts in reviewing these districts also uncomfortably entangles
judges in the political process. Weighed against these costs is the
concern that absent racial gerrymandering, minority politicians
would never achieve elected office. The election of Barack Obama to
the nation’s highest office thus undermines a foundational
assumption of racial gerrymandering under the Voting Rights Act.
An assessment of the 2008 election reveals that race continues to
play an enormous, albeit subtle, role in elections. Racially stratified
voting is pervasive. The same election that produced a black
President also witnessed the election of 39 black representatives,
almost all of whom come from districts that are more than one-third
black. Absent racial gerrymandering, the House would likely look
like the Senate, which now lacks even one elected black member.
Furthermore, the 2008 election continued a modern tradition of
racial subtext that promotes racially stratified voting. The
Presidential election itself included several explicitly racist
intrusions by fringe groups and sub-textual references by Candidate
Obama’s chief opponents. A full analysis of the 2008 election thus
shows that it cannot support the end of racial gerrymandering.
Limiting the Voting Rights Act to the protection of access to the polls
so as to ensure equal access would effectively end the careers of many
minority politicians. Many white voters happily voted for Barack
Obama. An assessment of the national legislature, however, suggests
that, like most Presidential candidates, he is an extraordinary
outlier, rather than the tip of a larger iceberg of post-racial elections.
III. THE 2008 ELECTION AND THE ROLE OF UNCONSCIOUS BIAS IN
EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS
It comes as little surprise that the 2008 election holds lessons for
the electoral process—it was an election after all. The election also
has some surprising lessons for how employment discrimination
functions. The election of the President of the United States is
undoubtedly the longest and most public job interview imaginable.127
As such, it provides an unusual case study of how racial
discrimination functions in the employment process.
127. Senator Clinton herself made the analogy between the Presidential campaign and
a hiring decision. Jim Acosta et al., Clinton: “Think About This as a Hiring Decision,”
May
18,
2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/05/18/
CNNPOLITICS.COM,
campaign.wrap/index.html.
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As with voting rights, the 2008 election arguably provides
superficial support for pulling back the reins on active legal
intervention to prevent discrimination. President Obama’s success
shows that the influence of explicit racism on employment has
diminished enormously. This comes as old news to employment
discrimination legal scholars who have long argued that Title VII’s
protections should be redirected toward eliminating the more
pervasive influence of unconscious or implicit racial biases.128 The
influence of unconscious bias is necessarily more difficult to identify
than explicit racism, thereby making it hard for reformers to argue
that Title VII jurisprudence needs to be extended to address such
biases. We contend that the 2008 election, paradoxically, provides
evidence that unconscious or implicit bias influences hiring decisions.
A broad look at the Obama campaign underscores the influence of
race on the 2008 election. To land the job of President, Obama had to
walk a veritable racial tightrope—building black support while not
alienating white voters.129 He had to navigate a minefield of
unconscious racial biases, just as any black job candidate would.
A. The Science of Implicit Racial Bias
Research on “implicit bias” demonstrates that race influences
unconscious cognitive and emotional reactions, wholly outside of
conscious, rational awareness.130 Psychologists term these
unconscious, emotional influences “implicit biases”—attitudes or
thoughts that people hold but might not explicitly endorse.131 These
attitudes commonly conflict with expressly held values or beliefs, as
demonstrated clearly by the December 2007 study we discussed
above, showing conflicts between the participants’ explicit and
implicit beliefs about whether Barack Obama or Tony Blair is more
American.132 Participants in that study knew, at a conscious level,
that Tony Blair is a British politician and Barack Obama is an
American. But their minds held internal associations that more
closely associated Tony Blair, particularly his ethnicity, with
characteristics that they think of as quintessentially American.

128. See infra Part III.B.
129. Amina Luqman, Obama’s Tightrope, WASH. POST, July 6, 2007, at A15.
130. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV 945, 951 (2006) (explaining that “implicit biases are
discriminatory biases based on implicit attitudes or implicit stereotypes”).
131. Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:
Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 5 (1995); see also Brian A.
Nosek et al., The Implicit Association Test at Age 7: A Methodological and Conceptual
Review, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE AUTOMATICITY OF HIGHER
MENTAL PROCESSES 265, 266 (John A. Bargh ed., 2007).
132. See Devos, supra note 115.
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Many people who embrace the egalitarian norm that skin color
should not affect their judgment of a job or political candidate also
unwittingly harbor negative associations with minorities.133 People
might not even be aware that they hold these attitudes.134 Even so,
these implicit cognitions influence how people evaluate others.135 The
implicit cognitive processes might heavily influence the final choice
of a voter who does not otherwise clearly embrace one candidate
over another.136
Over the last ten years, psychologists have identified ways to
measure these implicit cognitions. These measures have proven to be
particularly useful for studying bias against blacks for two key reasons.
The first is that when explicit measures are used, individuals may
not reveal their true attitudes or preferences because of social
desirability biases, thus attenuating the magnitude of the
relationship that researchers identify between attitudes and
political outcomes. A second comparative advantage of implicit
measures is that individuals may not even be aware of their true
preferences or attitudes.137

The Implicit Association Test (“IAT”) has rapidly become the most
widely used measure of implicit racial bias.138 The IAT basically
measures the relative strength of associations between pairs of
concepts. It does so with a simple computer task that asks
participants to sort stimuli into one of four categories. The four
categories are also paired together, so that the difficulty of the
sorting process produces a measure of how closely the person taking
the IAT associates the categories.139 For example, one of the most
common IAT tests asks participants to sort positive words, negative
words, black faces, and white faces. The task pairs white faces with
positive words and black faces with negative words and measures
how long it takes participants to sort randomly presented stimuli.
Then it alters the pairings to be white faces with negative words and
black faces with positive words, and again measures the time it takes
133. See Andrew Scott Baron & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Development of Implicit
Attitudes: Evidence of Race Evaluations from Ages 6 and 10 and Adulthood, 17 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 53, 56 (2006); Greenwald & Kreiger, supra note 130.
134. Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 131; see also Nosek et al., supra note 131.
135. See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit
Association Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 17 (2009); Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV.
L. SOC. SCI. 427, 435-37 (2007) (reviewing evidence that implicit social cognition
predicts behavior).
136. See infra Part III.C.1.
137. Cindy D. Kam, Implicit Attitudes, Explicit Choices: When Subliminal Priming
Predicts Candidate Preference, 29 POL. BEHAV. 343, 345 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
138. See Lane et al., supra note 135, at 430 (noting that techniques that assess
response times are the most widely used methods for ascertaining implicit attitudes).
139. Id. at 431.
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participants to sort the four types of stimuli. The difference in
average reaction times in the two different pairings provides a
measure of the participant’s association between the two categories
(white with good and black with bad versus white with bad and black
with good).140
IAT studies reveal that a majority of Americans more closely
associate black faces with weapons and white faces with harmless
objects than the opposite pairing.141 Additionally, participants
identified weapons faster when primed with black faces than white
faces.142 The proper interpretation of these results has been a matter
of some debate,143 but most scholars conclude that the IAT can
measure invidious implicit biases.144 Furthermore, the bias begins at
an early age. Baron and Banaji assessed white American six-yearolds, ten-year-olds, and adults using a child-oriented version of the
IAT. Remarkably, even the youngest group showed implicit prowhite/anti-black bias, with self-reported attitudes revealing biases in
the same direction. The ten-year olds and adults showed the same
magnitude of implicit race bias, but self-reported racial attitudes
became substantially less biased in older children and vanished
entirely in adults, who self-reported equally favorable attitudes
toward whites and blacks.145 It seems that people learn bias early but
only later learn to cover the bias by publicly embracing more
egalitarian norms.
The latter point shows the striking divergence between explicit
attitudes towards race and measures of implicit bias.146 Although
explicit and implicit measures of bias are related, even people who
openly embrace egalitarian norms often harbor very negative
associations concerning blacks.147 Even participants who are told that
the IAT measures undesirable racist attitudes and who explicitly
self-report egalitarian attitudes find it difficult to control their biased

140. Id.
141. Jack Glaser & Eric D. Knowles, Implicit Motivation to Control Prejudice, 44 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 164, 166, 168 tbl. 1 (2008).
142. B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled
Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 183-86,
188 (2001).
143. See Hal R. Arkes & Philip E. Tetlock, Attributions of Implicit Prejudice, or “Would
Jesse Jackson ‘Fail’ the Implicit Association Test?,” 15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 257 (2004).
144. See Greenwald & Kreiger, supra note 130; Lane et al., supra note 135; Kristin A.
Lane et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: IV: What We Know (So
Far) About the Method, in IMPLICIT MEASURES OF ATTITUDES 59, 62 (Bernd Wittenbrink &
Norbert Schwarz eds., 2007) [hereinafter Lane et al., Implicit Association Test].
145. Baron & Banaji, supra note 133, at 55-56.
146. See Lane et al., supra note 135, at 431.
147. See generally Baron & Banaji, supra note 133 (indicating that whereas seemingly
egalitarian views about race develop over time, implicit racial attitudes stay the same).
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responses.148 These findings suggest that the explicit and implicit
studies measure somewhat different cognitive systems. The explicit
measures show that most adults have learned the importance of
egalitarian norms, or at least the importance of embracing such
norms publicly. These explicit norms, however, reflect only the slower
deductive processes.
Implicit racial bias is not a mere abstraction. It is linked to the
deepest recesses of the mind—particularly the amygdala. The
amygdala is an almond-sized subcortical brain structure, involved in
emotional learning, perceiving novel or threatening stimuli,149 and
fear conditioning.150 Neurological research shows that whites react
to black faces with amygdala activation, even when shown black
faces subliminally.151 This activation does not occur in whites
processing white faces. Furthermore, the degree of amygdala
activation after exposure to black faces correlates with IAT scores.152
In short, whites who show evidence of a high degree of implicit bias
react to black faces, whether they know it or not, with some measure
of fear and anxiety.
The unconscious bias that the IAT measures also seems to affect
cognitive processes. In one study, subliminally priming participants
with the word “white” made it easier for them to recognize positive
words like “smart” than when they were primed with the word
“black.”153 Other studies show even more marked effects when
researchers use black and white faces as priming materials.154
Similarly, whites subliminally primed with black male faces reacted
to a staged computer mishap with much greater hostility than those
primed with white male faces.155 Other work shows that subliminally
priming people with words commonly associated with blacks could
lead individuals to interpret ambiguous behavior as more
aggressive.156 Consistent with the findings of the IAT, the
148. Do-Yeong Kim, Voluntary Controllability of the Implicit Association Test (IAT), 66
SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 83, 92 (2003).
149. Kevin N. Ochsner & Matthew D. Lieberman, The Emergence of Social Cognitive
Neuroscience, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 717, 720 (2001).
150. Id.; see also Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race
Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729, 729 (2000).
151. William A. Cunningham et al., Separable Neural Components in the Processing of
Black and White Faces, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 806, 811 (2004).
152. Id.
153. Samuel L. Gaertner & John P. McLaughlin, Racial Stereotypes: Associations and
Ascriptions of Positive and Negative Characteristics, 46 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 23, 23 (1983).
154. John F. Dovidio et al., On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and Controlled
Processes, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 510, 522-23 (1997).
155. John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait
Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230,
238-39 (1996).
156. Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled
Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 10-12 (1989).

2010]

IMPLICIT BIAS

687

associations most people have with blacks are different from those
they have with whites. Exposure to black faces, even at a subliminal
level, activates both the category “African American” and the
associated stereotypes and behaviors that go along with it. In turn,
white individuals seem simply to think differently, at least at an
intuitive level, about blacks than about whites.
Other striking demonstrations of the influence of unconscious
racial bias on behavior show that these biases can be lifethreatening. One study placed participants in a video game style
police simulation in which they had to assess whether a target was
holding a gun or a harmless object (wallet, soda can, or cell phone).157
Participants had to decide as quickly as possible whether to shoot the
target. Both black and white participants were more likely to
mistake a black target as armed when he in fact was unarmed;
conversely, they were more likely to mistake a white target as
unarmed when he in fact was armed.158 Furthermore, unconscious
anti-black bias correlated with the extent of this shooter bias.159 In
the area of health care, Green and his colleagues found that the
diagnoses of internal medicine and emergency medicine physicians
were associated with their unconscious bias.160 In that study, those
physicians who harbored implicit negative associations with black
patients diagnosed black patients differently than white patients.161
B. Implicit Bias and Title VII
As the moniker implies, implicit bias is bias; it puts a thumb on
the scale against its targets.162 Although Title VII was passed to
eliminate racial bias from employment decisions, it is challenging to
use a legal remedy to address an implicit bias of which employers
themselves might lack awareness. Although courts can detect the
influence of implicit bias in some ways, legal scholars have argued for
some time now that the current jurisprudence is not well suited for
eliminating the influence of implicit bias from the workplace.

157. Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1314, 1315-17, 1319, 1325 (2002).
158. Id. at 1317.
159. Glaser & Knowles, supra note 141.
160. Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its Prediction of
Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1231 (2007).
161. Id. The results of this study are complex. Overall, physicians were more likely to
diagnose black patients with coronary artery disease, and physicians with strong black-bad
associations assigned treatments differently to these patients. Id. at 1236 fig.3, 1237. The
combination produced similar treatment strategies for both black and white patients, albeit through different diagnostic routes. Id. at 1237.
162. See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist
Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063 (2006).
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Under Title VII, employers may not discriminate against
applicants or employees on the basis of a number of categories,
including race and color.163 Under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
a complainant establishes a prima facie case for racial discrimination
where he shows:
(i) [T]hat he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and
the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant’s qualifications.164

The burden then shifts to the employer to demonstrate a valid
nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the employee.165 An employer
cannot, however, use the complainant’s conduct as a pretext for the
discrimination, nor may it engage in racial double standards.166 In
turn, the employee must “demonstrate that the proffered reason was
not the true reason for the employment decision.”167 This may be done
directly by demonstrating that “a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s
proffered explanation” is not credible.168
This framework is not ideally suited to identifying the influence of
implicit bias.169 It can identify explicit, conscious biases and animus
much more easily than addressing biases people are not consciously
aware they harbor.170 People who hold overtly racist sentiments often
say as much in public ways. A police chief who says he does not
believe women make good officers or a human resources director who
states that she worries about hiring blacks because she thinks they
are lazy make easy targets for the law’s prohibition against
discriminatory hiring practices.171 Such individuals commonly try to
hide these sentiments, particularly in litigation, but it is easy for
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
164. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
165. Id. at 802.
166. Id. at 804.
167. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
168. Id.
169. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319, 322 (1987).
170. See Mijha Butcher, Using Mediation to Remedy Civil Rights Violations When the
Defendant Is Not an Intentional Perpetrator: The Problems of Unconscious Disparate
Treatment and Unjustified Disparate Impacts, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 225, 231-36
(2003); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995);
Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997 (2006).
171. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV.
969, 969-70 (2006).
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these people to slip up. Litigation might ultimately reveal the
discrimination in some way—perhaps through the discovery of casual
comments in depositions or through the identification of confidential
memoranda through document production. The reliance on
unconvincing pretexts that are easily identified might also be
common in those who deliberately discriminate.
Unconscious bias, however, is difficult to detect. People who hold
implicit biases against women or blacks are not necessarily aware of
these biases. People’s reports of their cognitive processes are often
not consistent with their judgments.172 Many influences on judgment
seem to operate outside of people’s awareness.173 Combining this
observation with contemporary research on the structure of the
brain, psychologists now argue that people rely on two distinct
cognitive systems of judgment: one that is rapid, intuitive, and
unconscious; another that is slow, deductive, and deliberative.174 The
intuitive system can often dictate choice, while the deductive system
lags behind, struggling to produce reasons for a choice that comports
with the accessible parts of memory. Thus, an intuitive gut reaction
against a job candidate can dictate a hiring decision. The rational
account only follows later and might not provide a fully accurate
account of the decision. People who harbor negative implicit
associations with black job applicants might assess resumes of
women or blacks more harshly than those of white males without
even being aware of what they are doing. Although
antidiscrimination laws ban the influence of race or gender in hiring
decisions regardless of the source of such influence, unconscious bias
can escape scrutiny.
Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger identified the role that
unconscious bias might play in employment discrimination almost a
decade and a half ago. Kreiger argued that most modern stereotyping
arises from “cognitive structures and processes involved in
categorization and information processing can in and of themselves
result in stereotyping and other forms of biased intergroup judgment
previously attributed to motivational processes.”175 Furthermore, it is
not only “bad” people who stereotype; as part of “normal cognitive
functioning,” all people categorize and stereotype natural objects as a
way “to simplify the task of perceiving, processing, and retaining
information about people in memory.”176 These stereotypes
172. See, e.g., Timothy De Camp Wilson & Richard E. Nisbett, The Accuracy of Verbal
Reports About the Effects of Stimuli on Evaluations and Behavior, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 118,
121-23, 125, 127 (1978).
173. See id.
174. See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6-9 (2007) (reviewing this literature).
175. Krieger, supra note 170, at 1187 (internal citation omitted).
176. Id. at 1188.
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unintentionally bias people’s judgment about members of other
groups and operate outside of one’s own conscious awareness.177
Although her work predated the development of the IAT, it presaged
the science that followed.
The existing Title VII framework does not easily square with the
view that bias arises from unconscious cognitive processes. The
courts generally assume that unless employers harbor discriminatory
intent or motive, they will not discriminate.178 As such, proving
discriminatory intent in the employment context is a high hurdle to
overcome.179 Under the analytical framework established by Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine and McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, proof of disparate treatment is evinced by three
steps.180 First, pretext analysis begins when the plaintiff presents a
prima facie case of discrimination.181 In response, the defendant has
the burden of producing legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its
decision to engage in the action at issue as it pertains to the
plaintiff.182 Second, the plaintiff can prevail only by proving that the
defendant’s proffered reason was not the “true reason[]” for the
decision,183 but merely a “pretext for discrimination.”184 According to
Krieger’s research:
The most common method of proving pretext is to show that the
employer’s proffered reason is not worthy of credence either
because it appears implausible in light of data upon which such an
employment decision should have been based, or because it
appears inconsistent with decisions reached in similar cases
involving employees outside of plaintiff’s protected class.185

This framework fails to account for the fact that race and sex
categorization “may distort perception, memory, and recall for
decision-relevant events such that, at the moment of decision, an
employer may be entirely unaware of the effect of an employee’s group
177. Id.
178. See id. at 1167.
179. See Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987) (indicating that
“[p]roof of such discrimination is always difficult”).
180. 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
181. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n.6; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
182. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993); Burdine,
450 U.S. at 254; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
183. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
184. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; see also McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 804.
185. Krieger, supra note 170, at 1179. Krieger goes on to provide examples such as “(1)
Evidence that the objective data maintained by the defendant did not support the result
reached by the decisionmaker; (2) Evidence that the decisionmaker seemed to undervalue
or ignore facts favorable to the employee; (3) Evidence that the decisionmaker made a
judgment about the plaintiff without being able to point to specific events which would
reasonably support such a judgment; or (4) Evidence showing that similarly situated Anglo
employees were on occasion treated more favorably.” Id. at 1180.
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membership on the decisionmaking process.”186 In essence, according
to Kreiger, current disparate treatment jurisprudence wrongly
construes how discriminatory motivation accounts for judgmental
strategies that employers use in decisionmaking. This occurs in three
ways. First, it assumes that discrimination occurs when a
decisionmaker refuses to consider an individual for a particular
position. Furthermore, it assumes that the decision arises out of
antipathy for that individual’s social group or because placing the
individual in the position in question violates role expectations for
members of the individual’s social group.187 Second, disparate
treatment jurisprudence assumes that “stereotypes can cause
discrimination when group status is consciously used as a ‘proxy’ for
some other job-relevant trait.”188 Third, it assumes that discrimination
occurs at the precise moment of the employer’s decisionmaking.189
The disparate treatment jurisprudence also mistakenly assumes
that decisionmakers possess adequate access to their own thoughts
as to why they will make, or have made, certain decisions.190 As such,
it assumes that decisionmakers are aware of the reasons why they
will make, or have made, employment decisions.191 With such
knowledge, well-intentioned decisionmakers comply with Title VII.192
In contrast, decisionmakers with bad intentions know when they are
taking an employee’s group status into account; when challenged,
they design pretexts to cover their tracks.193
Oddly enough, the human brain excels at creating pretext to cover
the role of unconscious motives.194 The brain commonly reacts with
an intuitive judgment, which the rational side must then explain,
almost as if the behavior were the product of external events. Thus,
in one unusual study where researchers gave subjects the somewhat
embarrassing task of picking out their favorite piece of lingerie,
participants tended to select the third choice, regardless of the
available options.195 When asked to explain their choice (an even
more embarrassing chore than selecting the favorite), subjects never
stated that they had simply selected the third option so as to avoid
having to think about the task, even though that was likely what
they were doing. They found some explanation, however silly, and
settled upon it. Similarly, in a study in which the researchers subtly
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 1167.
Id. at 1181-82.
Id. at 1182.
Id. at 1183.
Id. at 1167.
Id. at 1185.
Id.
Id.
See Wilson & Nisbett, supra note 172.
Id. at 123-24.
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manipulated subjects’ willingness to tolerate electric shocks, subjects
invented explanations to account for their tolerance of the pain.196
Even though a placebo pill was responsible for the tolerance, subjects
said things such as “I used to build radios and stuff when I was 13 or
14, and maybe I got used to electric shock.”197 The placebo pill
unconsciously influenced their tolerance, but the rational side of the
brain supplied an explanation. The brain’s ability to rationalize and
hide intuition is so profound that psychologists argue that the human
system of moral reasoning is founded entirely on intuition, even
though philosophers (and lawyers) treat it as highly rational,
coherent, and conscious.198
The rationalization of intuitive judgment seems to work well in
the employment context, at least in experimental settings.
Researchers have found that subjects selecting among resumes
adjust their rationalizations in ways that can accommodate bias. For
example, when the resume of a white job candidate showed more
experience than that of a black candidate, subjects emphasized the
importance of experience for the job; when the reverse was true they
claimed experience was not important.199 The rational, conscious side
of the brain seems geared to cover the potentially embarrassing
choices that the intuitive side might make. This tendency makes
ferreting out the influence of unconscious bias difficult.
Nevertheless, some courts have tried to recognize the influence of
unconscious bias in employment discrimination suits. Courts have
refused to grant defendant-employers summary judgment in Title VII
cases given employers’ “hidden or unconscious [discriminatory]
motives.”200 In fact, Shaw v. Cassar highlighted the following:
Overt and blatant discrimination is a relatively rare phenomenon .
. . . It is intentional discrimination in its covert hidden form that
now poses the real problem. Evidence of illicit intent may be
extremely difficult to obtain, whether the responsible individuals
are conscious of their bias, and therefore likely to try to hide it, or
whether they are expressing unconscious bias through some
discretionary decisionmaking process.201

196. Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 172, at 257.
197. Id.
198. See Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social
Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814 (2001).
199. Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Constructed Criteria: Redefining Merit to
Justify Discrimination, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 474 (2005).
200. Oxman v. WLS-TV, 609 F. Supp. 1384, 1387 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 1985).
201. 558 F. Supp. 303, 316 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 7, 1983) (quoting Elizabeth Bartholet,
Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under Title VII: United States Postal Service Board of
Governors v. Aikens, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1203 (1982)).
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Some courts have even stated that Title VII forbids unconscious
race bias,202 even though existing jurisprudence generally does not
accommodate such claims. Recognition of the role of unconscious bias
in employment discrimination would lead courts to be more skeptical
about pretext and to attend more closely to the context and
environment in which the bias allegedly operates. The election of a
black President, however, would suggest the opposite—that courts
embrace the notion that we have entered a post-racial period in
which claims of bias should be taken more skeptically. In the next
Section, we argue that the 2008 campaign refutes the latter idea.
C. Implicit Bias and the Obama Campaign
A key impediment to convincing courts that they need to recognize
the potential for unconscious bias in Title VII claims is a lack of
direct evidence that unconscious bias implicates employment
decisions outside of the context of psychology experiments. The
research clearly shows that implicit biases are widespread.203 It also
shows that implicit biases affect behavior and judgments that are
closely related to employment decisions, such as the amount of eye
contact an interviewer makes with a job candidate.204 Research also
indicates that implicit biases produce disparities in judgments in
hypothetical cases by doctors and even judges.205 It also shows that
implicit bias affects behavior in a realistic simulation, as in the
shooter bias study.206 But there remains no study that connects the
presence of implicit biases to actual employment decisions made in
the real world. To be sure, other studies carefully document the
existence of racial disparities in how job candidates are treated by
actual employers.207 These studies lack measures of implicit biases,
however, so the connection remains to be made.
202. Bush v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 990 F.2d 928, 931-32 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding
that an employer’s failure to adhere to its own set of rules invites “subjective
determinations likely to reflect unconscious racial bias”).
203. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 130, at 951, 955-56.
204. See id. at 961.
205. See Green et al., supra note 160 (discussing the role implicit bias plays in doctors’
diagnoses of black and white patients); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Bias
Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.1195 (2009) (discussing the role implicit bias
plays in judges’ rulings).
206. See Glaser & Knowles, supra note 141.
207. Mark Chen & John A. Bargh, Nonconscious Behavioral Confirmation Processes:
The Self-Fulfilling Consequences of Automatic Stereotype Activation, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 541, 552-54 (1997); John F. Dovidio et al., Implicit and Explicit Prejudice
and Interracial Interaction, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 62, 65-66 (2002); Allen R.
McConnell & Jill M. Leibold, Relations Among the Implicit Association Test,
Discriminatory Behavior, and Explicit Measures of Racial Attitudes, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 435, 438-40 (2001); see also Denise Sekaquaptewa et al., Stereotypic
Explanatory Bias: Implicit Stereotyping as a Predictor of Discrimination, 39 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 75, 77-78 (2003).
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Drawing upon several lines of argument, we contend that a close
analysis of the 2008 campaign documents some influence of
unconscious bias on voters’ decisions. We start by reviewing evidence
that implicit bias affects voting in general. We then present an
analysis of the political landscape that Candidate Obama faced,
drawing from reviews and discussions of the early months of his
candidacy. We then assess poll numbers from the primary election to
review how he successfully navigated this landscape. Finally, we
present an assessment of whether the so-called “Bradley Effect” and
the role it may have played in the 2008 election can be taken as
evidence of the role of implicit bias among the electorate. We contend
that the complete portrait shows a widespread influence of implicit
bias in the 2008 election.
We recognize that this conclusion seems ironic. After all,
Candidate Obama landed the job for which he was applying and
would have no claim under Title VII. But unlike most job applicants,
Candidate Obama had armies of people working to help him obtain
the position. More importantly, he had a professional staff of wellfunded campaign managers to help him navigate the landscape of
implicit bias in the electorate. To the extent his candidacy lays out a
blueprint for successfully navigating implicit racial bias, it reveals
the existence and influence of this bias.
1. Unconscious Bias and Voting in General
It is reasonably clear that implicit bias can influence voters.
Voting is not based solely on the deductive, deliberative system of
reasoning; intuition and emotion play significant roles in voter
choice.208 In one study involving a choice of candidates, for example,
the emotional responses to candidates accurately predicted voter
preferences for more than 90% of the decided voters and 80% of the
undecided voters.209 Spin doctors seem to know this. Most political
advertisements are meant either to inspire voter enthusiasm,
thereby motivating their political engagement and loyalty, or to
induce fear, thereby stimulating vigilance against the risks some
candidate supposedly poses.210 Other research shows that political
advertisements that provoke anxiety stimulate attention toward the

208. See generally DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN
DECIDING THE FATE OF THE NATION (2007).
209. William G. Christ, Voter Preference and Emotion: Using Emotional Response to
Classify Decided and Undecided Voters, 15 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 237, 238 (1985).
210. Ted Brader, Striking a Responsive Chord: How Political Ads Motivate and
Persuade Voters by Appealing to Emotions, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 388, 393-97 (2005).
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campaign and discourage reliance on habitual cues for voting; in
short, they can induce crossover voting.211
Likeability also affects voting. In one study, disengaged voters
who watched entertainment-oriented talk show interviews of Al Gore
and George W. Bush were more likely to vote against their party
loyalties when they found the crossover candidate likeable.212
Accordingly, politicians prime (that is, use subtle, if not subliminal,
messages) exposed and attentive voters to base their voting decisions
on issues and images emphasized during the campaign.213 Thus,
candidates have an incentive to use arguments that evoke emotions
such as fear, anxiety, and anger. Such emotional appeals allow
politicians to galvanize their base and attract uncommitted voters’
support. Moreover, the use of emotionally evocative appeals is
consistent with the media’s desire for excitement and drama in their
reporting.214 It is no surprise that such appeals influence voting
patterns, inasmuch as people’s implicit attitudes affect how they
vote.215 Emotion is clearly not a panacea for candidates. Politically
astute voters were not influenced by the extent to which they found
the candidates likeable.216 As with most decisions, both passion and
reason influence voting. All candidates must win the hearts and
minds of the voters—and the hearts are probably more important.
2. Walking the Racial Tightrope
Candidate Obama faced the daunting task of winning hearts and
minds that all candidates face. He also faced complex racial
challenges, particularly early on in the campaign, that other
candidates did not. As noted earlier, white voters seemed to wonder
whether candidate Obama was “too black.”217 At the same time, many
leaders in the black community openly wondered whether he was
“black enough?”218 On the one hand, candidate Obama married a
211. George E. Marcus & Michael B. Mackuen, Anxiety, Enthusiasm, and the Vote: The
Emotional Underpinnings of Learning and Involvement During Presidential Campaigns,
87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 627, 677-78 (1993).
212. Matthew A. Baum, Talking the Vote: Why Presidential Candidates Hit the Talk
Show Circuit, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 213, 223-30 (2005).
213. James N. Druckman, Priming the Vote: Campaign Effects in a U.S. Senate
Election, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 577 (2004).
214. Jennifer Jerit, Survival of the Fittest: Rhetoric During the Course of an Election
Campaign, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 563 (2004).
215. Westen, supra note 208; Inna Burdein et al., Experiments on the Automaticity of
Political Beliefs and Attitudes, 27 POL. PSYCHOL. 359, 359-71 (2006); Malte Friese et al.,
Predicting Voting Behavior with Implicit Attitude Measures: The 2002 German
Parliamentary Election, 54 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 247, 247-55 (2007).
216. Baum, supra note 212, at 217.
217. See supra Part II.C.1.
218. Luqman, supra note 129. Even when Obama ran for an Illinois congressional seat
against former Black Panther Bobby Rush, his blackness was questioned. Jeff Zeleny,
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black woman, lived in a predominantly black neighborhood, and
attended a predominantly black church. Two issues seem to have
raised the question in the minds of potential black voters, however.219
Blacks were initially not sure that Obama had the same experiences
as them since he was the child of an interracial union and had grown
up in Indonesia and Hawaii.220 Politically, black voters were also
suspicious of a black presidential candidate who seemed to have such
cachet with whites. They wondered what kinds of compromises a
black candidate would have to make to be elected.221 Many black
leaders worried that Obama could only be as black as white voters
would allow him to be.222 In contrast, Hillary Clinton built strong
support early in the black community based, in part, on her
husband’s popularity among black voters.223 Oddly enough, being
black had the potential to put candidate Obama at an early
disadvantage among black voters, even as he also had to become
appealing to white voters.
In addition to having his racial authenticity questioned, Obama
was handicapped by the fact that at least some black voters did not
believe he had a realistic chance of winning the November election.
Democratic activist Donna Brazile, a black woman who was Al Gore’s
2000 campaign manager, noted that black voters were pessimistic
about whether the country was ready for a black president.224 Some
blacks believed that when push came to shove, “they” (“they” being
anyone, maybe “the Republican smear machine,” the FBI, or the CIA)
would not let Obama win.225 Other blacks, including Senator Obama’s
wife, feared that he would be placed in harm’s way.226 Some went so
far as to fear that Obama would be assassinated and that not voting
for him was a way to protect him.227
When It Comes to Race, Obama Makes His Point—with Subtlety, CHI. TRIB., June 26, 2005,
at 1.
219. Jean Marbella, Who’s Right When Race Lies Below the Surface, BALT. SUN, Feb. 6,
2007, at 1B.
220. Gordon Jackson, Stirring the Nation’s Conscience, Obama Makes His Case for
Being “Black Enough,” MISS. LINK, Mar. 15, 2007, at A6; Marbella, supra note 219.
221. Nikole Hannah-Jones, Is Obama Black Enough? Blacks Care If He Shares Our
Values, Concerns, OREGONIAN, Aug. 26, 2007, at E01.
222. Id.
223. Jonathan Kaufman & Valerie Bauerlein, More Blacks Lean Towards Obama: Shift
in Allegiance from Clinton Could Tighten Primaries in the South, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14,
2007, at A5.
224. Karen Tumulty, Out of Reach?, TIME, Oct. 8, 2007, at 50.
225. Clarence Page, Will Black Voters Overcome “Fear of Possibility”?, BALT. SUN, Dec.
14, 2007, at 27A; Eugene Robinson, Obama and the “They” Sayers, WASH. POST, July 31,
2007, at A19.
226. Lynn Sweet, Michelle Obama to Play Bigger Role in Campaign: Candidate’s Wife
also his “Most Important Advisor,” CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 12, 2007, available at
http://www.suntimes.com/news/sweet/292926,CST-NWS-sweet12.article.
227. Jim Galloway & Bob Kemper, Blog: Political Insider: “America Is Readier to Elect
a White Woman than It Is an African-American Man,” ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 15, 2007.
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White voter support for Obama was complicated from the start.
Unlike previous black candidates, Obama enjoyed real success among
white voters. He won in Iowa and came close to winning in New
Hampshire, even though both states have only tiny black
populations.228 Even in South Carolina, the heart of the old South,
Obama attracted large percentages of white votes.229 Furthermore,
Obama achieved his unprecedented ability to raise money from the
grassroots with considerable support from white donors.
Views on the sources and meaning of Obama’s success among
whites were mixed in the early stages of his campaign. Some argued
that Gallop and Newsweek polls showing that Americans stated that
they would support a black President reflected a new reality and that
white voters now look beyond race.230 Others argued that enough
Americans were still preoccupied by race that Obama faced an uphill
struggle to capture enough white votes to succeed in a national
election.231 Lurking beneath Obama’s success in early primaries was
evidence that support among many whites was weaker than it
seemed.232 Even as Obama did well among whites in South Carolina,
he did far worse among whites there than he did in Iowa and New
Hampshire.233 Furthermore, as we discuss below, other black
candidates have found that white support in the polls sometimes has
a symbolic quality that erodes fast when it comes time to vote.234
Whites sometimes give pollsters responses they perceive to be
politically correct but act on different impulses in the voting booth.235
Even white voters who would ultimately vote for Obama were not
necessarily engaged in a race-neutral focus on his qualities as a
candidate, relative to Senator Clinton. Psychologists have long found
that many white Americans are somewhat well aware of their own
prejudices and those of the society in which they live and find facing
228. In Iowa, Obama won 38% of the votes; Clinton won 29%. Christina Bellatoni,
Huckabee, Obama Win in Iowa—Youth Support Bypasses Hillary, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 4,
2008, at A01. In New Hampshire, Clinton won 39% and Obama won 36%. Patrick Healy &
Michael Cooper, Clinton Is Victor, Defeating Obama: McCain Also Wins, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
9, 2008, at 1.
229. In South Carolina, Obama won 55% to Clinton’s 27%. Dan Balz et al., Obama Is
Big Winner in S.C.: Clinton 2nd After Bitter Campaign, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2008, at A1.
230. Jaun Williams, Obama’s Color Line, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2007, at 23.
231. Cynthia Tucker, Racial Bias So Deeply Embedded That You Might Not Recognize
It in You, BALT. SUN, Jan. 21, 2008, at 13A.
232. Healy & Cooper, supra note 228.
233. In Iowa and New Hampshire, Obama claimed 33% and 36%, respectively, of the
white vote. In South Carolina, he only took 24%. In contrast, Clinton’s share of the white
vote was 27%, 39%, and 38%, respectively. Steven Thomma, Dem’s Racial Chasm Persists:
S.C. Results Reinforce Opposite Challenges for Obama and Clinton, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER,
Jan. 27, 2008, at 8A.
234. Dick Polman, Barack Obama’s Race Seems to Be a Second-Tier Issue in ’08
Election, AUGUSTA CHRON., Jan. 24, 2007, at A05.
235. See infra notes 253-78 and accompanying text.
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these biases an unpleasant experience.236 They react by engaging in
actions designed to quell the uncomfortable sense that they and their
peers are biased. Senator Obama could benefit from the “aversive
racism” that many Americans feel, making his race an advantage
among white voters. A white voter who supports Obama does not
necessarily want a black man to be president but might only want to
be able to congratulate himself or herself for backing a black person.
As Bruce Llewellyn, Colin Powell’s cousin, told The New Yorker
magazine, “whites love the idea that, ‘[g]ee, we weren’t prejudiced.’ ”237
Obama had been careful to avoid using America’s racial legacy
against white voters. In doing so, according to Shelby Steele, Obama
granted whites the benefit of the doubt that they are decent
Americans who are not racists. In return for this gift, many whites
openly embraced Obama and gave him a fair chance to make his case
for his candidacy.238 Obama’s race “can implicitly encourage [white
voters] to feel that a vote for Obama is a vote for tolerance, for a
future free of the constricting prejudices of the past . . . .”239 If a black
man can attain this nation’s highest office—largely with the support
of white voters—maybe our nation finally judges people “on the basis
of the content of his character rather than the color of his skin.”240
Whites would like to believe that the nation is breaking free of racial
prejudice, and Senator Obama’s successful presidential campaign
allows them to do that.241 In essence, Senator Obama cast himself as
a bridge over the troubled waters of race relations to a post-racial
America. At least a certain segment of white voters supported him
because of that. During his Philadelphia “race speech,” however, he
disabused whites of this notion. He pointedly noted that resolving
America’s race problem was a collective responsibility.242 And
arguably, he paid a price for this assertion; he fared poorly among
white voters in the primaries that followed this speech.
The results in the spring primaries suggest that the disaffection of
working-class whites for the Democratic Party’s close association
with black voters continues to affect national politics. Even though
236. See generally Margo J. Monteith et al., Putting the Brakes on Prejudice: On the
Development and Operation of Cues for Control, 83 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL.
1029 (2002).
237. Polman, supra note 234.
238. See SHELBY STEELE, A BOUND MAN: WHY WE ARE EXCITED ABOUT OBAMA AND
WHY HE CAN’T WIN 74-75 (2007).
239. David Greenberg, Playing the Tolerance Card: How Obama Is like JFK, SLATE,
April 20, 2007, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2164662.
240. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE
ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 258 (1986).
241. See Polman, supra note 234.
242. Senator Barack Obama, Address at the Constitution Center, Philadelphia, Penn.:
A More Perfect Union (Mar. 18, 2008), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/
washwire/2008/03/18/text-of-obamas-speech-a-more-perfect-union.
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Senator Obama embraced more progressive positions than Senator
Clinton on issues of importance to working-class voters (such as free
trade), she consistently attracted more support from these voters
than he did.243 These voters might see Senator Obama as more
supportive of affirmative action than Senator Clinton, or see her as
stronger on some other issue, such as health care. Additionally,
Senator Clinton has not engaged in the kind of race baiting that has
characterized previous efforts of the Republican Party. She might not
need to do so, however, as these are the same voters Karl Rove, Jesse
Helms, the first President Bush, and Richard Nixon targeted in past
elections with racially motivated ads. Working-class white voters
seem inclined as Democrats on policy but as Republicans on race.
3. Implicit Bias and the Primary Election Part I
We separately assess the results of the Democratic primary
election from the general election and also separately provide a
secondary analysis of the accuracy of the polls in the primary election
as evidence of the “Bradley Effect.” The Democratic primary remains
of interest since, unlike the general election, it provides a comparison
of two candidates with similar political views. In assessing the
primaries, we are mindful that Senator Clinton made history by
almost becoming the first woman to capture the Presidential
nomination of a major political party. IAT studies show that most
adults more closely associate women with home life and men with
careers,244 which certainly might have affected Senator Clinton’s
candidacy. Our analysis tries to focus on the role race played and the
racial subtext of the campaign, but gender likely mattered as well.
If implicit bias affects voters, one would expect that, at a
minimum, those who harbor negative associations with blacks would
tend to oppose a black candidate. Democratic primary/caucus exit
polls indicate that Senator Obama had problems with white voters
during the primaries. As Table 1 shows, in twenty-seven out of
thirty-seven primaries or caucuses for which exit poll data was
available, Senator Clinton beat Senator Obama among white
voters.245 Asian and Latino Americans, who also express implicit
preferences for whites over blacks on the IAT (albeit to a lesser

243. Christi Parsons & John McCormick, Blue-Collar Vote Tough for Obama: Group
More Likely to Give Clinton Edge, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 10, 2008, at 1.
244. Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 131, at 15-17.
245. See
MSNBC.com,
2008
Primary
Results—Exit
Polls,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21660890; The Washington Post, Primaries and Caucuses,
Entrance and Exit Polls, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/2008-presidential-candidates/
primaries/exit-polls (last visited July 30, 2010) [hereinafter 2008 Primary Exit Polls]. Note
that Table 1 reports only those states in which we had data available from both black and
white voters.
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extent than whites)246 also voted for Senator Clinton in higher
numbers in eight out of eleven of those primaries/caucuses for which
data are available.247 Demographic groups that tend to harbor more
implicit anti-black bias also favored Senator Clinton. Those who
voted for Clinton over Obama tended to be older,248 poorer,249 and less
educated250 than Senator Obama’s supporters.
The disparity between black and white voters in the Democratic
primaries was astonishing. As illustrated in Table 1, the exit polls
show that black voters overwhelmingly supported Senator Obama,
especially as the primary season progressed. With the exception of
Senator Clinton’s state of New York, black voters’ support did not
depend much on geography, never falling below 72%, and usually far
exceeding that. But support among white voters varied enormously.
In every state, Senator Obama garnered more support from Black
voters than white voters. In fact, nowhere was the shift in support—
the “race gap”—less than a forty-seven-percentage point swing
(which occurred in South Carolina). That means that the percentage
of black voters who supported Senator Obama minus the percentage
of black voters who supported Senator Clinton was at least fortyseven points greater than the percentage of white voters who
supported Senator Obama minus the percentage who supported
Senator Clinton. At the most extreme, voters in Alabama, Arkansas,
New Jersey, Louisiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania shifted by more than
100 percentage points. In these States, black and white voters
behaved practically as mirror images of each other.

246. Greenwald & Kreiger, supra note 130, at 958.
247. Parks & Roberson, Michelle Obama, supra note 9, at 26.
248. In twenty-seven out of thirty-eight states, a greater percentage of eighteen to
twenty-four year-olds voted for Obama, whereas in twenty-five out of thirty-eight states, a
greater percentage of seniors age sixty-five and older voted for Clinton. Parks & Roberson,
supra note 9, at 42-43.
249. In nineteen out of thirty-eight states, a greater percentage of individuals who
earned less than $50,000 voted for Clinton, whereas in twenty-four out of thirty-eight
states, a greater percentage of individuals who earned more than $100,000 voted for
Obama. Id.
250. In twenty-six out of thirty-eight states, a greater percentage of individuals who
had only a high school education voted for Clinton, whereas in twenty-eight out of thirtyeight states, a greater percentage of individuals who had some post-graduate study voted
for Obama. Id.
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Table 1: Exit Poll Results for Spring Primaries by Race; % Supporting Each
Candidate251
State

Black Voters
Obama

Clinton

White Voters
Obama

Clinton

Race
Gap*

Black
% in
State

Winner

January Primaries / Caucuses
Iowac

72

16

33

27

50

2.1

O

Nevadac

83

14

34

52

77

6.8

C

South
Carolina

78

19

36

24

47

29.5

O

26

O

Super Tuesday Primaries / Caucuses
Alabama

84

15

25

72

106

Arizona

79

12

38

53

82

3.1

C

Arkansas

74

25

16

79

112

15.7

C

California

78

18

45

46

61

6.7

C

Connecticut

74

24

48

49

51

9.1

O

Delaware

86

9

40

56

83

19.2

O

Georgia

88

11

43

53

87

28.7

O

Illinois

93

5

57

41

62

15.1

O

Massachusetts

66

29

40

58

55

5.4

C

Missouri

84

15

39

57

87

11.2

O

New Jersey

82

14

31

66

113

13.6

C

New York

61

37

37

59

46

15.9

C

Tennessee

77

22

26

67

96

16.4

C

Louisiana

86

32.5

O

Mid-February Primaries / Caucuses
13

30

58

101

Maryland

84

15

42

52

79

27.9

O

Virginia

90

10

52

47

65

19.6

O

Wisconsin

91

8

54

45

74

5.7

O

Ohio

87

104

11.5

C

March Primaries / Caucuses
13

34

64

Texas

84

16

44

54

78

11.5

C

Mississippi

84

15

39

57

87

36.3

O

Pennsylvania

90

10

37

63

106

10

C

Indiana

89

11

60

40

58

8.4

C

North
Carolina

91

7

61

37

60

21.6

O

Kentucky

90

7

23

72

132

7.3

C

April-June Primaries / Caucuses

251. See 2008 Primary Exit Polls, supra note 245. Each state’s results can be accessed
by clicking on the state’s name.
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* Refers to the voting within race minus the cross race voting (% of black support for
Obama minus white support for Obama plus white support for Clinton minus black
support for Clinton).
C
Caucus; all others are primaries.

Black voters are more complicated, as we discuss below. Black
voters overwhelmingly supported Senator Obama throughout the
campaign, despite early concerns about whether he was authentically
black. Black Americans show greater variability in the results of the
race-IAT than other races, but between 32 and 65% of blacks favor
whites on the IAT.252 Thus, the data here are mixed. The fact that
black Americans express far less pro-white favoritism on the IAT
suggests that they would be more likely to support candidate Obama
than other races. The IAT data, however, does not predict the degree
of overwhelming support from black voters that candidate Obama
ultimately enjoyed.
4. Implicit Bias and the Primary Election Part II: The “Bradley
Effect”
The 2008 election featured the vigorous debate in the media over
the existence of the “Bradley Effect.” The Bradley Effect refers to the
tendency for the last-minute polls (and sometimes exit polls) to
overestimate voter support for the black candidate in an election
between a black and a white candidate. The moniker comes from the
1982 California governor’s race that pitted Los Angeles Mayor
Thomas Bradley, a black Democrat, against Attorney General George
Deukmejian, a white Republican. Bradley’s election would have made
him the first black American to be elected governor in the United
States,253 but Bradley lost the close election. Race was clearly not the
only factor in Bradley’s loss. An outpouring of conservative voters
bent on defeating a gun control referendum might also have been
a factor.254
Issues and the factors that influence voter turnout play a role in
any election, but the polling data suggested that race played a role in
Bradley’s defeat. Throughout the race, Bradley had led Deukmejian
by six to ten points in the Field Poll (the local version of the Gallup

252. Greenwald & Kreiger, supra note 130, at 958; John J. Jost et al., A Decade of
System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious
Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 881, 895 (2004) (citing C. Vincent Spicer &
Margo J. Monteith, Implicit Outgroup Favoritism Among Blacks and Vulnerability to
Stereotype Threat (2001) (unpublished manuscript on file with author)).
253. David Nyhan, Racism Cited as Factor in Bradley’s Loss; Minorities Make Gains in
US House, B. GLOBE, Nov. 7, 1982; William Raspberry, Blacks Didn’t Lose This Election,
WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1982, at A19.
254. Robert A. Jordan, Op-Ed., The Lessons of Bradley’s Defeat in California, B. GLOBE,
Nov. 10, 1982.

2010]

IMPLICIT BIAS

703

Poll).255 Bradley led by 14% in a poll published just one month before
the voting.256 The final Field Poll gave Bradley 48% and a seven-point
lead. Yet, Bradley lost by one percentage point, 49 to 48%,257 a defeat
by 52,295 votes out of 7.5 million.258 This was the only major error in
a final Field Poll in its fifty-year history.259
The error in the Field poll suggests that some voters might have
been unwilling to reveal their racial preferences. They might simply
have lied to pollsters about their choice, producing a gap between poll
numbers and actual results. Alternatively, the variations between
the polling results and the actual voting might reflect last-minute
changes of heart. In fact, virtually all of the undecided white
Democrats and Independents broke for the GOP candidate.260 At the
last minute, in the privacy of the voting booth, a number of whites
simply could not pull the lever to elect a black man as governor.261
Seven years after Bradley’s bid to become the first black governor,
L. Douglas Wilder claimed that title when he beat J. Marshall
Coleman, a white Republican, for Virginia’s governorship. Wilder
defeated Coleman by garnering slightly more than half of the 1.78
million votes cast.262 Although Wilder won and the capital of the
former Confederate States seated the nation’s first black governor,
the election’s results were, like those in California, at odds with preelection polls conducted in the final week of the campaign.263 Polling
data had found that Wilder had been between four and fifteen
percentage points ahead of Coleman.264 Because Wilder was leading
in every public and private poll, most experts argued that Coleman
made up the difference with a surge in the final days of the
election.265 But the Virginia race added a new twist to the Bradley
255. Patrick Reddy, Does McCall Have a Chance?; Yes, He Does, but Black Candidates
for Top State Offices Face an Uphill Climb, BUFF. NEWS, Jan. 20, 2002, at H1.
256. Nyhan, supra note 253.
257. Reddy, supra note 255.
258. Jordan, supra note 254; Nyhan, supra note 253.
259. Reddy, supra note 255.
260. Id.
261. Raspberry, supra note 253. Some voters were more explicit. A poll conducted by
the Los Angeles Times revealed that 8% of the Democrat and Independent crossover voters
(meaning that they voted for the Republicans) indicated that they felt that government was
doing too much for blacks and other minorities. A CBS-New York Times exit poll of actual
voters showed that 3% of the voters admitted outright that their gubernatorial decision
was based on race. Mark Shields, It Wasn’t White Racism that Beat Tom Bradley, WASH.
POST, Nov. 12, 1982, at A31. Pollster Mervin Field said 3% of voters, asked in exit polls
why they rejected Bradley, “offered as their reason . . . that they could not vote for a black
man.” Nyhan, supra note 253.
262. The Associated Press reported Wilder winning by 5,533 votes, while United Press
International gave him a 7,755-vote spread. Kent Jenkins, Jr., & R.H. Melton, Wilder
Revels in His Triumph: Slim Margin Puzzles Analysts, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1989, at A1.
263. Id.
264. Id.; see also Reddy, supra note 255.
265. Jenkins & Melton, supra note 262.
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Effect. The exit poll surveys suggested that Wilder would win by
about ten points. In effect, a full 10% of the voters in the exit poll
reported that they had voted for the black candidate immediately
after they had cast their ballot for the white candidate.
The election of David Dinkins as Mayor in New York City during
the same election cycle produced a similar phenomenon. In 1989,
Dinkins, a black Democrat, ran against Rudolph Giuliani, a white
Republican, in the New York mayoral race. New York City voters
elected Dinkins, their first-ever black mayor.266 But on Election Day,
the media started the day reporting results of pre-election public
opinion polls that gave Dinkins a double-digit lead over Giuliani. Exit
polls in New York suggested that Dinkins would win by at least six to
ten points267—possibly even as many as fourteen to twenty-one.268
Just as in the Wilder-Coleman race, however, pre-election polls
greatly overstated Dinkins’ lead; Dinkins won by a much narrower
margin than polls had shown.269 In the end, Dinkins polled 50% to
Rudolph Giuliani’s 48%.270 Pollsters groped for explanations for the
closer-than-predicted margins, and some offered a simple answer:
Survey respondents lied, or they changed their minds from black to
white in the privacy of the voting booth.271
To some, the influence of the Bradley Effect on the elections in
New York and Virginia in 1989 bore the taint of insidious and deepseated racial prejudice.272 If the voters did not intend to pick the
black candidate, why lie to the pollsters? The answer lies in how
subtle racism can be. Those who might have lied in post-election
surveys would deny they are prejudiced; they know it is publicly
unacceptable to appear to make decisions on the basis of race. The
mindset of some voters may have best been captured in the comment
of a white voter in the Bronx, “I like Giuliani. He looks good. He’s
white like me.”273 For others, as political scientist Larry Sabato
stated, “It’s socially acceptable to vote for a black candidate . . .
Whites tell pollsters ahead of time that they are voting for the black
candidate, and then they go into the voting booth and can’t quite pull
down that lever.”274

266. Editorial, Why Did They Lie?, POST-STANDARD, Nov. 14, 1989, at A10.
267. Id.
268. Dan Balz, Vote Counting Methods, Race Factor in Polls Leave Plenty of Room for
Error; Some Blame Voters for Off-the-Mark Projections, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1989, at A37.
269. Tom Baxter & Dwight Morris, Voters May Lie About Voting Against Blacks—
Numbers Don’t Add Up from Polls to Election, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 9, 1989, at A21.
270. Balz, supra note 268; Why Did They Lie?, supra note 266.
271. Gary Langer, Dinkins, Wilder Showings Poorer than Expected, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Nov. 9, 1989, at 14A; Why Did They Lie?, supra note 266.
272. Why Did They Lie?, supra note 266.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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More controlled survey research supports the existence of the
Bradley Effect. A study by Berinsky demonstrates that voters are
reluctant to express preferences concerning racially polarizing issues
for fear of appearing racist.275 In his study, voters who privately
opposed school integration were unwilling to express their opposition
publicly.276 Rather than say they were opposed to integration, voters
sought race-neutral principles to express their opposition—
responding with “I don’t know.” Though the results from the 1989
data may be different in type from the school integration results in
the study, Berinsky notes that they are similar in kind. In both cases,
the “no opinion” result seemed to be a cover—for at least a significant
proportion of the sample—for opposition to policies and candidates in
choices that are racially sensitive. Whites who are apprehensive
about voting for black candidates simply “vacate the field” in preelection polls; they declare themselves undecided rather than come
out and say that they oppose a black candidate.277 In this study,
“[t]his similarity between the school integration results and the 1989
pre-election poll results carrie[d] over to a simulation that predicts
respondent’s candidate choice.”278
Many pollsters have argued that the lack of a Bradley Effect in
the more recent Senatorial races in North Carolina and Tennessee
suggests either that the phenomenon is a thing of the past, or that it
was the product of over-interpreting statistical noise in a few selected
elections. The spring primaries, however, produced both evidence of
the effect and evidence of how it is evolving.
The first primary of the spring season produced a Bradley Effect.
Before voting in New Hampshire, polls had Senator Obama leading
Senator Clinton by roughly twelve points in the State.279 But like Los
Angelinos before them, New Hampshire voters flinched at the last
minute and would not admit as much to the pollsters. To be sure, some
commentators denied that the Bradley Effect was at work in New
Hampshire and cited alternative explanations.280 The polls were
conducted before Clinton moved voters by tearing up in a diner and
before she had a successful debate.281 Furthermore, many independent

275. Adam J. Berinsky, The Two Faces of Public Opinion, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1209,
1213, 1221 (1999).
276. Id. at 1221.
277. KEITH REEVES, VOTING HOPES OR FEARS?: WHITE VOTERS, BLACK CANDIDATES,
AND RACIAL POLITICS IN AMERICA 87 (1997).
278. Berinsky, supra note 275, at 1224.
279. Kenneth Lovett, Obama Has 13-Point NH Lead, N.Y. POST, Jan. 7, 2008, at 004.
280. See Michael Graham, Op-Ed Primary Wrongly Colored Racist by Matthews, B.
HERALD, Jan. 11, 2001.
281. Michael Fauntroy, Don’t Overplay the “Bradley Effect,” HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 9,
2008,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-fauntroy-phd/dont-overplay-the-bradl_
b_80810.html.
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voters “who told pollsters before the election they planned to vote for
Obama but then voted for Republican John McCain because Obama
was so far ahead they believed he would win easily.”282
Although other factors could have had some effect in the polling
miscue, substantial evidence supports the idea that the Bradley
Effect played a role. First, the small residue of undecided voters and
small number of independent voters who switched to McCain cannot
account for the thirteen-point shift between the final polls and the
actual results. Second, as was the case with the Wilder election, the
exit polls were consistent with previous polls; voters clearly lied to
pollsters both before and after they had voted.283 These factors have
led many commentators to conclude that the Bradley Effect
influenced the outcome in New Hampshire.284
As Table 2 shows below, the Bradley Effect took a different turn
as the primaries proceeded.285 The erosion of the support for Senator
Obama between the final polls and the actual electoral results was
most robust in primary states with black populations under 7%:
California, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. By
contrast, polls were basically accurate in states with black
populations near the national black population of 12.8%: Illinois,
Indiana, Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas. A reverse Bradley Effect—
whereby pollsters underestimated support for Senator Obama—
occurred in Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Virginia, all of which have a 19% or higher black
population.286 Missouri seemed slightly out of place in this trend, as
282. Robert Gammon, Clinton Victory Tainted by Race?, EASTBAY EXPRESS, Jan.
10, 2008, available at http://www.eastbayexpress.com/92510/archives/2008/01/10/
clinton-victory-tainted-by-race.
283. Id.
284. Graham, supra note 280 (citing MSNBC commentator Chris Matthews’
perspective on what took place in New Hampshire). “You remember the Lone Ranger and
Tonto?” Matthews asked another MSNBC pundit, Joe Scarborough. “I think paleface speak
with forked tongue.” Id. In stating such, Matthews implied “that white New Hampshire
Democrats lied to pollsters about supporting Obama because they are bigots who never
had any intention of voting for a black man.” Id. He went on to say, “I thought white
voters stopped being what they didn’t want to be. You know what it tells me? White people
aren’t proud of who they are.” Id. When asked whether his complaints might be more
appropriate to the South than New England, Matthews replied “Boston? BOSTON? . . .
There’s a different kind of prejudice in the North than in the South. It may not be ‘I think
I’m better than you,’ but it might be ‘I don’t want to live next door to you.’ ” Id.; see also
Tim Graham, Matthews Lectures Forked-Tongue ‘Paleface’ Bigots of New England,
NEWSBUSTERS, Jan. 10, 2008, http://www.newsbusters.org/blogs/tim-graham/2008/01/10/
matthews-lectures-forked-tongue-paleface-bigots-new-england.
285. Anthony G. Greenwald, Tracking the Race Factor, PEW RES. CENTER
PUBLICATIONS, Mar. 14, 2008, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/755/tracking-the-race-factor
(providing the source of the data reported here); see also Peter Aldhous, Why Pollsters Are
Flummoxed Over Clinton and Obama, NEW SCIENTIST, Mar. 30, 2008, available at http://
www.newscientist.com/article/mg19726493.800-why-pollsters-are-flummoxed-over-clintonand-obama.html (reviewing this evidence).
286. Greenwald, supra note 285.
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its population is only 11% black, and it expressed a slight reverse
Bradley Effect, but the effect was small. Of the eighteen states with
open primaries and available data, only Wisconsin was inconsistent
with the trend. States with small black populations expressed the
Bradley Effect; states with large black populations expressed the
reverse Bradley Effect.
Table 2: Pre-Election Overestimate of Support for Senator Obama by State*
State

Percentage point
Overestimate of Obama’s
Support**

% Black in Population

States Showing a Bradley Effect
New Hampshire

+ 11

0.7

California

+ 11

6.7

+8

5.4

+8

4.5

Massachusetts
Rhode Island

States in Which Polls Were Accurate
Ohio

+3

11.5

New Jersey

+2

13.6

Texas

+2

11.5

Illinois

+1

15.1

0

16.4

-4

8.4

Tennessee
Indiana

States Showing a Reverse Bradley Effect
Missouri

-6

11.2

North Carolina

-6

21.6

Mississippi

-7

36.3

Virginia

- 10

19.6

Wisconsin

- 13

5.7

Alabama

- 15

26.0

South Carolina

- 17

29.5

Georgia

- 17

28.7

* The Table includes only the eighteen states with open primaries on which sufficient
data were available.
** Positive numbers indicate that the polls overestimated support for Obama; negative
numbers indicate that the polls underestimated support.

Although evidence is unclear as to exactly how this unusual
polling pattern emerged, the pattern is consistent with the idea that
voters rely on both intuitive/emotional and deductive/rational
systems of judgment to decide how to cast their ballots. White
Democratic voters could convince themselves to vote for Senator
Obama in a rational, deductive way. Democrats who vote in the
primaries tend to be more liberal than the average voter and are
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likely closer to Senator Obama’s policy positions than Senator
Clinton’s more moderate positions. But these factors represent
rational reasons to vote for a candidate. Even though candidate
Obama’s positions were closer to those of most Democrats who vote in
primaries than candidate Clinton’s and even though candidate
Obama largely refrained from raising overtly black issues, he is still
visibly black: he looks black, has a black family, and attends a black
church. When pollsters ask voters how they have voted, they are
somewhat embarrassed at having relied on their baser instincts and
state that they voted for Senator Obama. Hence, when white voters
dominate the electorate, the Bradley Effect emerges.
Black voters had almost the opposite perspective on Senator
Obama’s candidacy, especially early on. Black voters also tend to be
more liberal than the average voter and hence also embrace views
closer to Senator Obama’s positions than Senator Clinton’s. But many
black Americans deeply believed that a black candidate could not win
the Presidency. And black Americans support Democrats in national
elections in overwhelming numbers. Thus, to a large segment of black
voters, it might rationally have seemed better to support Senator
Clinton in hopes of having a better chance of having a Democrat win in
the general election. But the emotional allure of voting for a viable
black candidate—something many black Americans thought that they
would never see—could have led to an impulsive move in the voting
booth. Thus, when the electorate includes large numbers of black
voters, they elevate the support at the booth exceeds estimates based
on what they had told pollsters. In effect, many black and white voters
had opposite instincts, rationally supporting one candidate up until
their emotional sides overtook them in the end, thereby producing
opposite tendencies in the elections.
The results from the caucuses support this thesis as well. Unlike
elections, caucuses require a public vote. Thus they do not allow for
voting for a white candidate in private while announcing support for
the black candidate in public. Senator Obama did better among white
voters in caucuses than in primaries. Like the evidence that white
voters lie in exit interviews, Senator Obama’s strength in caucuses
suggests that some white voters confront a last-minute tendency to
flinch at the idea of voting for a black man. Further, they are
sufficiently embarrassed at this instinct that they lie about it in exit
polls in conventional elections and suppress this tendency when
forced to vote in public in caucuses.287
The 2008 Democratic Primary thus produced results that are
thoroughly influenced by race. The divergence between black and
287. Voters in caucuses also tend to be more liberal than in elections, which might also
account for greater support for Obama in the caucuses.
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white voters was enormous and thorough. Black voters
overwhelmingly supported Senator Obama at the polls. White voters
were more mixed, but many states saw Senator Clinton winning by
huge margins of thirty points or more. So thorough was the influence
of race that it even produced muddled reactions to inquiries by
pollsters that likely reflected the difficult reconciliation of egalitarian
social norms with emotional internal reactions.
5. The General Election: A Surprise Ending
The polling numbers in the general election witnessed a
surprising absence of the effects of implicit bias. State by state, the
polls were largely accurate.288 The combined Bradley and reverse
Bradley Effects did not emerge as they had in the primaries. Black
voters overwhelmingly supported Obama, but Obama won among
white voters in nineteen states.289
Some predictable demographics related to voting behavior in the
general election as well. Younger voters overwhelmingly voted for
Obama.290 Nationally, Obama received 66% of the votes from voters
ages eighteen to twenty-nine, while McCain received only 32%.
McCain carried the majority of votes from senior voters (age sixtyfive and above).291 Education did not provide a reliable predictor,
although McCain did slightly better among less well-educated white
voters.292 Traditional political divisions influenced the general
election. Those who earned less than $50,000 a year more likely
voted for Obama, while those who earned more than $100,000 a year
voted for McCain and Obama evenly.293 Of course, the overall pattern
of victories in the states largely followed the breakdown of red and
blue states from the last few national elections.
After a long campaign that featured some measure of racial
subtext and a racially stratified pattern of voting in the Democratic
primary, how is it that the November Presidential election looked
free from the influence of race? In the words of James Carville, “it’s
the economy, stupid!”294 Obama did well among voters who worried
about the economy.295 Obama won twenty-seven states among voters
288. See generally CHUCK TODD & SHELDON GAWISER, HOW BARACK OBAMA WON: A
STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO THE HISTORIC 2008 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 51-246 (2009)
(providing a state-by-state breakdown of the results of the 2008 election).
289. Id. at 247-48.
290. Id. at 30-31.
291. Id. at 31.
292. Id. at 33.
293. Id. at 34.
294. Richard Alleyne, Gordon Brown: It’s the Economy, Stupid!, TELEGRAPH, May 23,
2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/byelection/2015038/Gordon-Brown-Itsthe-economy-stupid.html.
295. TODD & GAWISER, supra note 288, at 43.
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who were worried about the national economy at the time of the
general election.296 Similarly, McCain won twenty-eight states among
voters who were not worried about the national economy, versus four
for Obama (the rest lack data or were too close to call).297
Candidate Obama also surely benefited from the nature of how
implicit bias and prejudice function in general. By the time of the fall
campaign, Barack Obama was a genuine celebrity. He had enjoyed
largely positive press coverage for many months, which likely meant
that most voters had developed associations that were unique to him.
Bias tends to operate by filling in the blanks: when whites see a black
man in a dark alley pulling an ambiguous object out of his wallet,
their minds tend to fill in the detail with a gun, rather than a
harmless wallet. Upon meeting a black job candidate for the first
time, someone who harbors negative associations with blacks will
rely on those associations to evaluate the employee. By late August of
2008, however, Barack Obama was no longer just a black man—he
was Barack Obama. The constant media exposure would have
ensured that many voters developed their own associations for just
him alone.
Ironically, the long primary might have helped him enormously.
At the outset of the primaries, voters still more closely associated
Tony Blair (white politicians in general) with the concept of America
than black politicians, but we doubt that this association persisted
into the fall. Obama was certainly still a black candidate, but by
August of 2008, he was the most well known black candidate in
American history. Research on voters’ attitudes shows that lingering
implicit biases remained, as some voted against him because they felt
he was too foreign.298 But the simplest forms of bias can, and likely
did, dissipate with familiarity.
Senator Obama also benefited from an unexpected political subtext.
Every high school civics class in America teaches that as the financial
markets plummeted during the Great Depression, a Republican
President clung to the principle that the government should not
intervene. Whether true or not, most Americans believe that the
interventions of Franklin Roosevelt were essential to keeping the
nation from outright revolution and complete collapse. The script of a
Democrat moving the government to rescue the economy from the
dangers of Republican-sponsored free market excess is well known. To
his credit, candidate Obama excelled at taking advantage of the script,
while Senator McCain seemed hesitant. The most effective single line
296. See id. at 51-246.
297. See id.
298. Eric D. Knowles et al., Anti-Egalitarians for Obama? Group-Dominance
Motivation and the Obama Vote, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 965, 967-68 (2009).
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of the campaign might have been when Obama ribbed McCain for
halting his campaign by asserting that the President has to be able to
manage more than one crisis at a time. It made McCain seem
befuddled, thereby also playing off of another source of implicit
biases—biases against the elderly.299
As one commentator put it, “a drowning man doesn’t care what
color the person is who throws him a life preserver.”300 To many,
Senator Obama seemed to offer that life vest. The polls showed the
candidates to be dead even right before the collapse of Lehman
Brothers—the event that triggered the financial crisis of 2008-09. A
week later, Senator Obama took the lead, never to lose it again.301
It is important to note that implicit bias has its limits. White job
applicants do not always get hired in preference to black applicants.
The November results remind us somewhat of the 1970s movie
Blazing Saddles, in which a desperately racist, but also just plain
desperate white town in the Old West finds itself with no choice but
to hire a black sheriff to defend itself. A National Public Radio
interview conducted in Wisconsin, right before that state’s primary,
illustrates the point. The interviewer asked a Republican diner
owner whom he supported in the upcoming election. The owner
indicated that he would vote Democratic in 2008, out of concern for
the economy and the direction of the nation. When asked which
candidate he would support in the primary, the owner said, “I think
I’m going to vote for that black boy.”302 The latent racism is inherent
in the statement, of course, but so too is the willingness to overcome
the racism to hire someone who appeared, to that voter, to be able to
address the nation’s problems.
D. Conclusion: Employment Discrimination and the 2008 Election
The 2008 election demonstrates why the effectiveness of Title VII
continues to depend on taking steps to ensure that it addresses
unconscious bias. The campaign was filled with racial subtext and
included some explicit racism by fringe elements. It also produced
wildly disparate voting patterns by race, especially in the primaries.
Additionally, the primaries produced an odd, but highly reliable set
of polling errors that suggest a lurking racial influence. This
299. Project Imiplicit—FAQs, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/
faqs.html (last visited July 30, 2010).
300. Kimberly Hefling, McCain Losing Ground with Working-Class Whites,
FOXNEWS.COM,
Oct.
10,
2008,
http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2008Oct10/0,4670,
WorkingClassVoters,00.html.
301. See Gary Langer, Daily Tracking Poll: Barack Obama Leads John McCain in
Tone; Economy’s His Main Boost, ABC NEWS, Oct. 31, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/
PollingUnit/Politics/story?id=6157353&page=1.
302. Shocked, Shocked to Find Such Anger in the Black Church!, TALKING POINTS MEMO,
Mar. 15, 2008, http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/ann_h/2008/03/09-week.
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influence dissipated somewhat by the fall, but the landscape that the
2008 election presents would hardly be comforting to a black job
candidate. The message that with a team of experts and a barrage of
positive media exposure, you can get hired if an employer really sees
you as uniquely valuable is not one that indicates that the nation has
entered a post-racial phase.
The widespread racial polarity in voting in the primaries is as
close as one can get to evidence of disparate impact in a unique
situation like this. This disparate impact triggers further inquiry,
demanding an explanation for the pattern. The general election
resembles the Democratic-Republican split over the last few years
and so would probably pass muster. But the primaries are harder to
explain without reference to race.
Furthermore, any court assessing a Title VII claim would have to
attend closely to the racist commentary and subtext that ran through
the campaigns. Courts have encountered many of the explicitly racist
references made about candidate Obama in Title VII actions and
repeatedly held them to constitute evidence of bias.303 Many of the
kinds of explicitly racial rhetoric, and even some of the subtexts that
appeared in the 2008 campaign, have also appeared in Title VII
cases: references to blacks as primates;304 imitating blacks engaging
in “shuck-and-jive talk;”305 using the word “tar baby” on a work
bulletin board;306 joking references to blacks enjoying fried chicken;307
associations between blacks and watermelon;308 the use of the term
“uppity” in reference to black employees;309 implying that minorities
303. Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological Research Related to
Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73
MO. L. REV. 83, 96-99 (2008).
304. “To suggest that a human being’s physical appearance is essentially a caricature
of a jungle beast goes far beyond the merely unflattering; it is degrading and humiliating
in the extreme.” White v. BFI Waste Servs. LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 298 (4th Cir. 2004). The use
of the term monkey and other similar words has been part of actionable racial harassment
claims across the country. See Webb v. Worldwide Flight Serv., Inc., 407 F.3d 1192, 1193
(11th Cir. 2005) (dealing with an employment discrimination action in which a plaintiff’s
manager called him a monkey); Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 182 (4th Cir.
2001) (dealing with an employment discrimination action in which a plaintiff was called
“monkey” and “dumb monkey”); Jeffries v. Metro-Mark, Inc., 45 F.3d 258, 260 (8th Cir.
1995) (dealing with an employment discrimination action in which a plaintiff was called a
monkey); Daniels v. Pipefitters’ Ass’n Local Union No. 597, 945 F.2d 906, 910 (7th Cir.
1991) (dealing with an employment discrimination action in which plaintiffs were called
“porch monkeys” and “baboons”).
305. Marvelli v. Chaps Cmty. Health Ctr., 193 F. Supp.2d 636, 646 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
306. Carter v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 456 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 2006).
307. Smith v. Fairview Ridges Hosp., 550 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1057 (D. Minn. 2008)
(citing Copeland v. Hussman Corp., Civ. No. 4:06-839, 2007 WL 3171427, at *7 (E.D. Mo.
Oct. 26, 2007)).
308. Bassett v. City of Minneapolis, 211 F.3d 1097, 1101 (8th Cir. 2000).
309. Rivers-Frison v. Se. Mo. Cmty. Treatment Ctr., 133 F.3d 616, 621 (8th Cir. 1998);
Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1199 (8th Cir. 1981).
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are not American enough;310 calling an employee “too ethnic” or “problack;”311 and raising concerns about blacks engaging in inter-racial
relationships.312 Courts have held that these kinds of stray remarks
can help support a claim of discrimination when they are made by an
actual decisionmaker313 closely in time with the employment
decision314 in an effort to express discrimination315 and in a way that
is related to the decisionmaking process.316 Although the major
candidates avoided explicitly racial remarks, some of the true
decisionmakers—the voters—indulged in such efforts in an effort to
demean candidate Obama.
The reliance of courts on “stray remarks” represents a serious
effort to begin to deal with implicit bias in employment
discrimination. Courts historically treat such remarks as
meaningless sophomoric humor in employment discrimination cases.
The Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, for example,
faced a case that was filled with highly gendered stray remarks and
yet did not find them to be meaningful.317 These are the kinds of
comments that “leak” from those who harbor implicit biases.
Unconscious, anti-black bias is correlated with the use of verbal slurs
towards blacks.318 The 2008 campaign should not, therefore, be taken
as evidence that these comments need no longer be taken seriously.

310. Zayed v. Apple Computers, No. C 04-01787 JW, 2006 WL 889571, at *1-2, *9 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 5, 2006).
311. Gordon v. JKP Enters., Inc. , No. 01-20420, 2002 WL 753496, at *2, *8 (5th Cir.
Apr. 9, 2002).
312. Zeigler v. K-Mart Corp., No. 95-3019, 1996 WL 8021, at *1 (10th Cir. Jan. 10,
1996); Chacon v. Ochs, 780 F. Supp. 680, 682 (C.D. Cal. 1991); Reiter v. Ctr. Consol. Sch.
Dist., 618 F. Supp. 1458, 1460 (D. Colo. 1985); Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of SeventhDay Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1365-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
313. McMillan v. Mass. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288,
301 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999); Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126
F.3d 506, 521 (3d Cir. 1997); Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277,
290-91 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. dismissed, 543 U.S. 1132 (2005); Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82
F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996); Tooson v. Roadway Express, Inc., 47 Fed. Appx. 370, 375 (6th
Cir. 2002); Gorence, Wolf, and Bruce v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., 242 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir.
2001); Merritt v. Tellabs Operations, Inc., 222 Fed. Appx. 679, 683 (10th Cir. 2007); EEOC
v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920, 924 (11th Cir. 1990).
314. McMillan, 140 F.3d at 301; Walden, 126 F.3d at 513-14; Brown, 82 F.3d at 655;
Gorence, 242 F.3d at 762; Merritt, 222 Fed. Appx. at 683.
315. Brown, 82 F.3d at 656; Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Missouri, Inc.,
139 F.3d 631, 633-34 (8th Cir. 1997).
316. McMillan, 140 F.3d at 301; Woroski v. Nashua Corp., 31 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir.
1994); Brown, 82 F.3d at 655; Gorence, 242 F.3d at 762; Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043,
1055 (9th Cir. 1999); Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th Cir. 2000);
Merritt, 222 Fed. Appx. at 683; Alton Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d at 924; Thomas v. Nat’l
Football League Players Ass’n, 131 F.3d 198, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
317. 490 U.S. 228, 277-79 (1989).
318. See generally Laurie A. Rudman & Richard D. Ashmore, Discrimination and the
Implicit Association Test, 10 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 359, 361-63 (2007).
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Rather, the campaign itself shows how pervasive they are and how a
job candidate must navigate them.
IV. CONCLUSION: POST ELECTION AND BEYOND
Research conducted after the election suggests that President
Obama’s success might be a misleading indicator of racial progress.
Some voters who harbor anti-egalitarian racial views nevertheless
cast their ballots for Obama largely to support the claim that the
United States is now a post-racial country.319 His election might even
facilitate backsliding on racial progress. One study demonstrates
that individuals become more willing to describe a job as better
suited for whites than for blacks after expressing support for
President Obama as a presidential candidate.320 This result suggests
that showing “support for Obama grants people moral
credentials”321—where an individual’s track record of egalitarian
racial views provides them with an ethical certification that later
facilitates racially biased decisions. It is akin to hiring or promoting a
token black employee so as to avoid implementing a more
widespread, systematic effort to rid a workplace of bias.322 Addressing
implicit bias at an individual level requires active cognitive and
social effort. Belief that bias is a thing of the past might lead those
with the desire to avoid acting on their implicit biases to let down
their guard and might give license to those inclined to discriminate to
carry on.
In the long run, President Obama’s electoral success is good news
for American race relations, of course. Current models of prejudice
and stereotype reduction support the view that the 2008 election will
reduce the effect of implicit biases overall. This work reveals that
people can help avoid the influence of implicit biases if they: 1) are
aware of their bias; 2) are motivated to “change their responses
because of personal values, feelings of guilt, compunction, or selfinsight;”323 and 3) possess cognitive resources needed to develop and
319. See id.
320. Daniel A. Effron et al., Endorsing Obama Licenses Favoring Whites, 45 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 591 (2009).
321. Id. at 590.
322. For research on tokenism in the workplace, see for example ROSABETH MOSS
KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (1977). The courts have recognized
tokenism in the workplace as well. See Manning v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Civ. A. No. 906838, 1992 WL 170552, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 1992).
323. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic
Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked
Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 803-05 (2001); Nilanjana Dasgupta,
Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations,
17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 157-58 (2004); Patricia G. Devine et al., Prejudice with and
Without Compunction, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 817, 820-21, 825-27 (1991).
What is consistently found is that individuals—whites in particular—who are “more
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practice correction.324 The outcome of the 2008 election facilitates all
of these factors. Exposure to high-esteemed black Americans reduces
implicit bias, and the nation will now have at least four years of daily
exposure to a black man occupying the highest office.325 The Obama
Administration has also appointed other minorities to prominent
positions (most recently, Justice Sotomayor), creating even more role
models that are vastly contrary to stereotypes.326
The United States has moved far from its brutal racial history, but
it is still a work in racial progress. It is not that President Obama’s
election ends the debate on race, as his campaign highlighted myriad
ways in which a modern conception of racial prejudice can and must be
understood. His election will provide a new way to think about race in
American life. It represents an auspicious beginning to new modes of
thinking about the role of law in helping this society reach its racial
egalitarian ideals. But it is still only the beginning of a new era.

internally motivated” to reduce their levels of race bias show “less implicit prejudice,
whereas those who [are] more externally motivated display[] more implicit prejudice.”
Leslie R. M. Hausmann & Carey S. Ryan, Effects of External and Internal Motivation to
Control Prejudice on Implicit Prejudice: The Mediating Role of Efforts to Control Prejudiced
Responses, 26 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 215, 220-22 (2004). Specifically, high
internal and low external motivation to reduce race bias appears to be the best method to
reduce implicit race bias. Irene V. Blair & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Automatic and Controlled
Processes in Stereotype Priming, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1142, 1151-53, 115557 (1996); Patricia G. Devine et al., The Regulation of Explicit and Implicit Race Bias: The
Role of Motivations to Respond Without Prejudice, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
835, 839-44 (2002).
324. Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note 323, at 800; Blair & Banaji, supra note 323, at
1145-48.
325. Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note 323, at 805.
326. Jerry Kang, Behavioral Realism: Future History of Implicit Bias and the Law,
Lecture at Ohio State University (Nov. 2006), available at http://jerrykang.net/Engage.
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